Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/15551
Título: Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
Autor: Castel-Branco, Miguel Moraes
Orientador: Branco, Fernando
Data de Defesa: 17-Set-2012
Resumo: This dissertation presents a game theoretic approach to bidding fee auctions with independent private values. I analyze these auctions under two bidding window rules. In a sequential bidding auction the round moves forward immediately after a bid was submitted. In a multiple round auction, the round moves forward only after all players have submitted their action. Under the assumption that the bidders may either have a low value or a high value for the object, I show that multiple equilibria, with relevantly different characteristics, may arise under either rule. Moreover, the rule that maximizes the seller’s revenue depends on the the probability of a high value bidder.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/15551
Aparece nas colecções:FCEE - Dissertações de Mestrado / Master Dissertations
R - Dissertações de Mestrado / Master Dissertations

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Miguel Castel-Branco (2012) - Multiple Equilibria in Bidding Fee Auctions.pdf1,7 MBAdobe PDFVer/Abrir

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