Publicação
Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions
| datacite.subject.fos | Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Branco, Fernando | |
| dc.contributor.author | Castel-Branco, Miguel Moraes | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-11-10T12:05:33Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-11-10T12:05:33Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-09-17 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation presents a game theoretic approach to bidding fee auctions with independent private values. I analyze these auctions under two bidding window rules. In a sequential bidding auction the round moves forward immediately after a bid was submitted. In a multiple round auction, the round moves forward only after all players have submitted their action. Under the assumption that the bidders may either have a low value or a high value for the object, I show that multiple equilibria, with relevantly different characteristics, may arise under either rule. Moreover, the rule that maximizes the seller’s revenue depends on the the probability of a high value bidder. | por |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/15551 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | por |
| dc.title | Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions | por |
| dc.type | master thesis | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | por |
| rcaap.type | masterThesis | por |
| thesis.degree.name | Mestrado em Economia |