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O presente ensaio propõe-se investigar um aspeto particular da teoria fenomenológica da consciência, tal como foi formulada por Edmund Husserl. Husserl defende que os princípios que fundam as ciências se encontram todos na consciência pura. Tentou-se, por isso, em primeiro lugar, perceber o que entende Husserl por consciência, antes de mais nas Investigações Lógicas, ou seja, antes da chamada «viragem transcendental», de seguida nas lições de Göttingen de Introdução à Lógica e à Teoria do Conhecimento, contemporâneas dessa viragem e testemunho público dela, por fim, em Ideias I e Ideias II, onde ela se encontra já realizada. Um segundo núcleo de problemas diz respeito à necessidade de introduzir um Eu puro, ou seja, um polo de identidade, na atividade da consciência, ou se, pelo contrário, todo o Eu será apenas de carácter empírico. O ensaio procura averiguar as resistências de Husserl relativamente à admissibilidade de um Eu puro antes da «viragem transcendental», por meio de uma compreensão da noção de imanência intencional como solução para a resolução do problema da constituição da objetividade. Um terceiro núcleo de problemas, embora abordado com maior brevidade, diz respeito à própria noção fenomenológica de transcendental, com tudo o que a aproxima e distingue da tematização kantiana do «Eu penso».
This paper addresses a particular aspect of the phenomenological theory of consciousness, as is was formulated by Edmund Husserl. Husserl stresses the fact that the foundational principals of the empirical sciences have their place in pure consciousness. We tried to understand, in the first place, what Husserl means by consciousness, beginning with the Logical Investigations, i.e. before the so-called «transcendental turn», next, in the Göttingen course intitled An Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, contemporary of this turn and a public testemony of it, and at last in Ideas I and Ideas II, where it is already accomplished. A second nucleous of problems regards the necessity of introducing in the activity of consciousness a pure Ego, i.e. an identity pole, modifying the former thesis according to which the Ego has only an empirical character. In the paper we try to grasp the meaning of Hussel’s resistencies againsts the hypothesis of a pure Ego before the «transcendental turn», and to understand the meaning of the concept of intentional imanence as a solution to the problem of constitution of objectivities. A third nucleous, although more briefly addressed, regards the phenomenological notion of a transcendental Ego, what connects and at the same time distinguishes it from the kantian «I think».
This paper addresses a particular aspect of the phenomenological theory of consciousness, as is was formulated by Edmund Husserl. Husserl stresses the fact that the foundational principals of the empirical sciences have their place in pure consciousness. We tried to understand, in the first place, what Husserl means by consciousness, beginning with the Logical Investigations, i.e. before the so-called «transcendental turn», next, in the Göttingen course intitled An Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, contemporary of this turn and a public testemony of it, and at last in Ideas I and Ideas II, where it is already accomplished. A second nucleous of problems regards the necessity of introducing in the activity of consciousness a pure Ego, i.e. an identity pole, modifying the former thesis according to which the Ego has only an empirical character. In the paper we try to grasp the meaning of Hussel’s resistencies againsts the hypothesis of a pure Ego before the «transcendental turn», and to understand the meaning of the concept of intentional imanence as a solution to the problem of constitution of objectivities. A third nucleous, although more briefly addressed, regards the phenomenological notion of a transcendental Ego, what connects and at the same time distinguishes it from the kantian «I think».
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Consciência Constituição Egologia Imanência Intencionalidade Transcendental Transcendência Consciousness Constitution Egology Imanence Intentionality Transcendental Transcendence