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Abstract(s)
A introdução da possibilidade do voto plural para a sociedades cotadas - que permite uma divergência entre o valor das ações detidas e o direito de voto conferido pelas mesmas - veio alterar o paradigma da aplicação do princípio da proporcionalidade no direito das sociedades comerciais. No entanto, tal disrupção, embora benéfica para a dinamização do mercado de capitais, não está isenta de críticas, desde logo pela falta de ambição do seu âmbito subjetivo, mas também no que diz respeito às opções de regime. Tratando-se de direitos especiais dos acionistas, é imperativo que se apliquem as limitações constantes das regras referentes às categorias de ações, tendo o legislador, em certos casos, remetido expressamente para os preceitos aplicáveis às ações preferenciais sem voto. Adicionalmente, torna-se fundamental perceber o alcance deste novo regime e qual a influência na implementação de outras figuras com interesse para a saúde das sociedades comerciais, tais como as ações de lealdade.
Establishing the possibility of granting multiple voting rights in listed companies – which allows to set up a difference between the value of the shares held and the voting right granted by such shares – has changed the paradigm for the application of the proportionality principle in company law. However, such disruption, though beneficial for the development of the capitals market, is not free from criticism, not only in what concerns the lack of ambition of its subjective spectrum, but also in what regards some options made on the applicable regime. As these new shares provide for special shareholders rights, it is mandatory to apply limitations arising from share classes regime, and the legislator, in certain cases, expressly refers to the rules applicable to non-voting preference shares. Furthermore, it is fundamental to access the range of this new regime and how it influences the implementation of other mechanisms with interest to the good health of companies, such as loyalty shares.
Establishing the possibility of granting multiple voting rights in listed companies – which allows to set up a difference between the value of the shares held and the voting right granted by such shares – has changed the paradigm for the application of the proportionality principle in company law. However, such disruption, though beneficial for the development of the capitals market, is not free from criticism, not only in what concerns the lack of ambition of its subjective spectrum, but also in what regards some options made on the applicable regime. As these new shares provide for special shareholders rights, it is mandatory to apply limitations arising from share classes regime, and the legislator, in certain cases, expressly refers to the rules applicable to non-voting preference shares. Furthermore, it is fundamental to access the range of this new regime and how it influences the implementation of other mechanisms with interest to the good health of companies, such as loyalty shares.
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Keywords
Voto plural Sociedades cotadas Direitos especiais Categorias de ações Princípio da proporcionalidade Ações de lealdade Multiple voting rights Listed companies Special rights Dual shares One share one vote Loyalty shares