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Abstract(s)
A presente dissertação efetua uma revisão de literatura sobre a manipulação de resultados nas empresas portuguesas não cotadas, que consequentemente afeta a qualidade de informação das suas demonstrações financeiras.
O fenómeno de manipulação de resultados é complexo e de difícil deteção, o que torna este tema controverso e de análise relevante, principalmente para os leitores das demonstrações financeiras.
As razões porque os indivíduos cometem fraude ou manipulam as demonstrações financeiras podem ser várias. Para tentar explicar este acontecimento Donald Cressey criou o chamado “Triângulo da Fraude”.
Em que o primeiro vértice contempla a necessidade financeira sentida pelo indivíduo, caracterizada pela pressão própria sentida quer por necessidade de liquidez financeira quer por integração num grupo social cujo somatório entre as possíveis perdas e ganhos e a justificação para os seus atos (racionalização) o leva a decidir pela prática ou não de atos fraudulentos. Neste triângulo também se encontra considerada a oportunidade que pode ser caracterizada através de falhas do controlo interno.
Desta forma, esta dissertação pretende averiguar de acordo com diferentes graus de rentabilidade as empresas que tendem mais a manipular os seus resultados, tendo em conta os diferentes objetivos destas empresas e dos seus gestores.
De entre vários métodos de deteção de manipulação de resultados foi escolhido o que se aplica melhor a análise em questão, sendo que alguns deles são de difícil aplicação para grande nº de empresas e contextos diferentes.
O modelo utilizado, elaborado por Francis (2004), parte de outros modelos já criados para estabelecer uma ligação entre sete atributos, entre os quais a qualidade dos accruals, para verificar a qualidade de informação das demonstrações financeiras e o impacto que tem nas decisões dos investidores. Através de um modelo econométrico que vamos utilizar para calcular a qualidade dos accruals na nossa amostra, este chega a conclusões sobre as influências dos atributos como iremos explicar de seguida.
As empresas que têm uma melhor rentabilidade têm assim um incentivo maior de fuga aos impostos enquanto, as empresas que apresentam uma rentabilidade mais reduzida necessitam de maior financiamento e desse modo vão ter um conflito de incentivos quando chega a hora de tomar decisões. Isto porque, estas precisam de apresentar melhores resultados para obterem melhores taxas de financiamento mas ao mesmo tempo querem pagar menos imposto.
Daqui pode-se esperar que as empresas manipulem mais quando têm uma rentabilidade mais elevada, de forma a reduzirem o valor a entregar ao Estado.
Através da análise das regressões concluímos que as empresas que têm mais tendência a manipular são as que têm rentabilidades mais elevadas e mais reduzidas de acordo com o esperado.
This thesis makes a literature review on the results of manipulation in unlisted Portuguese companies, which consequently affects the quality of information in its financial statements. The phenomenon of earning management is complex and difficult detection, which makes this controversial and relevant analysis theme, especially for readers of the financial statements. Within the earning management definition exists manipulation of actual transactions and handling of accrued expenses and revenues. The results consist of cash flows and accruals of expenses and revenues, and the handling of each of these components will affect the results. A manager can make operational decisions with an impact on financial numbers - cash flows, such as offering products with high discounts in the end of the year in order to anticipate sales to reach a goal or cut spending on research and development. The second form of managers achieve the desired results is to handle the increases in spending and revenues. In this method, the company does not change its activity, but rather opportunistically recorded profit of its existing activities. Examples that increase the results are the reduction of provisions, capitalize expenses and avoid depreciation of assets. Accrued expenses and revenues create the opportunity to manipulate results because there is a need for estimates, forecasts and judgments. This type of manipulation is derived from selective interpretation of accounting rules, since the company is free to choose between the existing methods in the standards. The reasons why individuals commit fraud can be several. To try to explain this event Donald Cressey created the so-called "Triangle of Fraud." In the first vertex includes financial need felt by the individual, characterized by felt own pressure or by need for financial liquidity either by integration into a social group whose sum of the possible gains and losses and the justification for their acts (rationalization) takes to decide to practice or not fraudulent acts. In this triangle is also considered that the opportunity may be characterized by internal control failures. Thus, this dissertation seeks to ascertain according to different degrees of profitability companies that are more likely to manipulate the results, taking into account the different objectives of these companies and their managers. Among several match-fixing detection methods was chosen that best applies the analysis in question, some of which are difficult to apply to large number of companies and different contexts. The model developed by Francis, La Fond, Olsson, Schipper 2004 from other models already created to establish a link between seven attributes, including the quality of accruals and deferrals, to check the quality of information in the financial statements and the impact it has on investor’s decisions. Through an econometric model that we use to calculate the quality of accruals and deferrals in our sample, this draws conclusions about the influence of the attributes as we explain below. Companies that have a better profitability thus have a greater incentive for tax evasion while, companies that have a lower profitability require increased funding and thus will have an incentive conflict when it comes time to make decisions. This is because they need to deliver better results to get better financing rates but at the same time want to pay less tax. It can be expected that most businesses to manipulate when they have a high yield in order to reduce the amount to deliver to the state. Through the analysis of regressions we concluded that companies are more likely to handle are those that have higher yields and lower in line with expectations.
This thesis makes a literature review on the results of manipulation in unlisted Portuguese companies, which consequently affects the quality of information in its financial statements. The phenomenon of earning management is complex and difficult detection, which makes this controversial and relevant analysis theme, especially for readers of the financial statements. Within the earning management definition exists manipulation of actual transactions and handling of accrued expenses and revenues. The results consist of cash flows and accruals of expenses and revenues, and the handling of each of these components will affect the results. A manager can make operational decisions with an impact on financial numbers - cash flows, such as offering products with high discounts in the end of the year in order to anticipate sales to reach a goal or cut spending on research and development. The second form of managers achieve the desired results is to handle the increases in spending and revenues. In this method, the company does not change its activity, but rather opportunistically recorded profit of its existing activities. Examples that increase the results are the reduction of provisions, capitalize expenses and avoid depreciation of assets. Accrued expenses and revenues create the opportunity to manipulate results because there is a need for estimates, forecasts and judgments. This type of manipulation is derived from selective interpretation of accounting rules, since the company is free to choose between the existing methods in the standards. The reasons why individuals commit fraud can be several. To try to explain this event Donald Cressey created the so-called "Triangle of Fraud." In the first vertex includes financial need felt by the individual, characterized by felt own pressure or by need for financial liquidity either by integration into a social group whose sum of the possible gains and losses and the justification for their acts (rationalization) takes to decide to practice or not fraudulent acts. In this triangle is also considered that the opportunity may be characterized by internal control failures. Thus, this dissertation seeks to ascertain according to different degrees of profitability companies that are more likely to manipulate the results, taking into account the different objectives of these companies and their managers. Among several match-fixing detection methods was chosen that best applies the analysis in question, some of which are difficult to apply to large number of companies and different contexts. The model developed by Francis, La Fond, Olsson, Schipper 2004 from other models already created to establish a link between seven attributes, including the quality of accruals and deferrals, to check the quality of information in the financial statements and the impact it has on investor’s decisions. Through an econometric model that we use to calculate the quality of accruals and deferrals in our sample, this draws conclusions about the influence of the attributes as we explain below. Companies that have a better profitability thus have a greater incentive for tax evasion while, companies that have a lower profitability require increased funding and thus will have an incentive conflict when it comes time to make decisions. This is because they need to deliver better results to get better financing rates but at the same time want to pay less tax. It can be expected that most businesses to manipulate when they have a high yield in order to reduce the amount to deliver to the state. Through the analysis of regressions we concluded that companies are more likely to handle are those that have higher yields and lower in line with expectations.
Description
Keywords
Manipulação de resultados Qualidade de informação Incentivos à manipulação Auditoria Resultados auditoria Earning management Quality information Incentives for earning management Auditing Audit results