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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Isaiah Berlin’s conception of pluralism is often confused with relativism. The purpose of
this thesis is to assess the solidity of his arguments concerning the distinction between
the two theories against the backdrop of two interpretations by two very different
thinkers that similarly approximate pluralism to relativism: John Gray, the radical
pluralist, and Leo Strauss, the steward of naturalism.
Berlin tendered a conception of pluralism whereby the inevitable conflict among values
proves they are equally valid, equally absolute and sometimes incommensurable, thus
rendering the inevitability of choice a fundamental element of the human condition. This
theory emerges as an alternative to monism, but its distinction from relativism merits
special consideration given that both theories are often regarded as similar.
Despite acknowledging variety within ethics, Berlin argues the theories remain distinct
for two reasons: first, pluralism allows for the possibility of judging moral choices as
right or wrong beyond their respective contexts whereas relativism does not; and second,
pluralism, unlike relativism, asserts values are objective because they are universal. Each
of these two arguments shall be assessed from two angles respectively: the first analysis
will address the capability for moral choice considering the incommensurability factor
and the role context plays in decision making; whereas the second shall look at the claim
that values are universal from the point of view of its implications and the theory’s
foundations. In conclusion, Berlin’s arguments appear to stand the test.