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A tese descreve o diálogo entre Robert Nozick e o Pensamento Social Católico (PSC) nas respetivas propostas de Estado – mínimo e subsidiário, percorrendo os temas que lhe subjazem: o entendimento do que é ser pessoa, de liberdade, de propriedade e de justiça. Nas diferentes conceções de pessoa humana que legitimam a existência do Estado, temos em confronto a tese do PSC, que defende a sociabilidade intrínseca da pessoa humana, a necessitar de tutela estadual ela mesma; e a tese de Nozick, que entende que apenas os individuos e os seus interesses são de ter em conta na conceção de Estado. Segue-se o debate sobre as respetivas visões de liberdade, mediado por Isaiah Berlin e os seus Two Concepts of Liberty, com Nozick a considerar a liberdade exclusivamente em termos negativos, como direitos de não interferência, e o PSC a defender as duas conceções de liberdade, negativa e positiva, como necessárias numa sociedade ao serviço da pessoa humana. Repassamos a tradição do PSC nesta matéria para lhe traçarmos as linhas de permanência no tema da liberdade, vista essencialmente como responsabilidade. O debate evolui para a propriedade, pois nela assenta integralmente a proposta de Nozick para a liberdade: em confronto temos Nozick a defender a propriedade, incluindo a propriedade de si mesmo como direito absoluto e a única base para a tutela do Estado; e o PSC a defender a função social da propriedade, e vendo nela um direito natural não absoluto, mas subordinado ao destino universal dos bens tendo em conta a opção preferencial pelos pobres. A conceção de justiça para as duas perspetivas é exposta seguidamente, com Nozick a propor uma teoria da justiça histórica e sem atender às consequências, argumentando contra as teorias padronizadas e redistributivas (que considera violarem o princípio kantiano do “fim em si mesmo”); em confronto com uma proposta de justiça entendida como o “bem do outro”, integrando as dimensões comutativa, legal, distributiva e social. Por fim, as respetivas propostas de Estado: o Estado mínimo e a utopia nozickiana confrontado não só com o PSC, mas também com a crítica anarquista na sua própria elaboração; e o Estado subsidiário do PSC, também em debate com a utopia nozickiana, na defesa do que considera ser o modelo mais idóneo para dar resposta à dignidade da pessoa humana e ao seu florescimento.
The thesis describes the dialogue between Robert Nozick and Catholic Social Thought (PSC) in the respective State proposals – minimum and subsidiary, covering the themes that underlie it: the understanding of what it means to be a person, freedom, property, and justice. In the different conceptions of the human person that legitimize the existence of the State, we have in confrontation the PSC thesis, which defends the intrinsic sociability of the human person in need of State protection itself; and Nozick's thesis, which understands that only individuals and their interests should be considered for the conception of the State. The debate on the respective visions of freedom follows, mediated by Isaiah Berlin and his Two Concepts of Liberty, considering Nozick freedom exclusively in negative terms, such as rights of non-interference, and the PSC defending the two conceptions of freedom, negative and positive, as necessary in a society at the service of the human person. We review the PSC's tradition to outline the lines of permanence in the theme of freedom, seen essentially as responsibility. The debate evolves towards property, as Nozick's proposal for freedom is entirely based on it: in confrontation we have Nozick defending property, including self-ownership as an absolute right and the only basis for the protection of the State; and the PSC, defending the social function of property, and seeing it as a natural right that is not absolute, but subordinate to the universal destination of goods, taking into account the preferential option for the poor. The conception of justice for the two perspectives is subsequently exposed, with Nozick proposing a theory of historical justice without considering the consequences, arguing against patterned and redistributive theories (which he considers violating the Kantian principle of the “end in itself”); in comparison with a proposal of justice understood as the “good of the other”, integrating the commutative, legal, distributive, and social dimensions. Finally, the respective State proposals are presented: Nozickian minimal State confronted not only with the PSC, but also with anarchist criticism, in its elaboration; and the subsidiary State of the PSC, also in debate with the Nozickian utopia, in defence of what it considers to be the most suitable model to respond to the dignity of the human person and his flourishing.
The thesis describes the dialogue between Robert Nozick and Catholic Social Thought (PSC) in the respective State proposals – minimum and subsidiary, covering the themes that underlie it: the understanding of what it means to be a person, freedom, property, and justice. In the different conceptions of the human person that legitimize the existence of the State, we have in confrontation the PSC thesis, which defends the intrinsic sociability of the human person in need of State protection itself; and Nozick's thesis, which understands that only individuals and their interests should be considered for the conception of the State. The debate on the respective visions of freedom follows, mediated by Isaiah Berlin and his Two Concepts of Liberty, considering Nozick freedom exclusively in negative terms, such as rights of non-interference, and the PSC defending the two conceptions of freedom, negative and positive, as necessary in a society at the service of the human person. We review the PSC's tradition to outline the lines of permanence in the theme of freedom, seen essentially as responsibility. The debate evolves towards property, as Nozick's proposal for freedom is entirely based on it: in confrontation we have Nozick defending property, including self-ownership as an absolute right and the only basis for the protection of the State; and the PSC, defending the social function of property, and seeing it as a natural right that is not absolute, but subordinate to the universal destination of goods, taking into account the preferential option for the poor. The conception of justice for the two perspectives is subsequently exposed, with Nozick proposing a theory of historical justice without considering the consequences, arguing against patterned and redistributive theories (which he considers violating the Kantian principle of the “end in itself”); in comparison with a proposal of justice understood as the “good of the other”, integrating the commutative, legal, distributive, and social dimensions. Finally, the respective State proposals are presented: Nozickian minimal State confronted not only with the PSC, but also with anarchist criticism, in its elaboration; and the subsidiary State of the PSC, also in debate with the Nozickian utopia, in defence of what it considers to be the most suitable model to respond to the dignity of the human person and his flourishing.
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Keywords
Estado mínimo Estado subsidiário Robert Nozick Pensamento social católico Doutrina social da igreja Libertarismo Subsidiariedade Teoria do justo título Justiça social Liberdade positiva Liberdade negativa Destino universal dos bens Opção preferencial pelos pobres Direitos Pessoa Sociedade Estado Minimum state Subsidiary state Catholic social thought Social doctrine of the church Libertarianism Subsidiarity Entitlement theory Social justice Positive freedom Negative freedom Universal destination of goods Preferential option for the poor Rights Person Society State