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Abstract(s)
O presente trabalho tem como objecto a análise das possibilidades de concretização dos direitos económicos e sociais por via judicial a partir do exame do tipo das normas/directrizes que se podem extrair do modelo constitucionalmente consagrado para aqueles direitos, procurando responder à questão de saber que tipo de obrigações e direitos se podem retirar das normas constitucionais consagradoras de direitos económicos e sociais.
Considerando as consequências que a execução judicial desses direitos exerce ao nível das políticas públicas, a nossa abordagem procura avaliar até que ponto é função dos Tribunais pronunciarem-se sobre as formas de realização daqueles direitos, se podem ou não extrair, directamente, das respectivas normas direitos a prestações e determinar de forma coerciva a sua implementação, e em caso afirmativo que critérios poderão ou deverão orientar o julgador no correspondente processo decisório.
A nossa análise parte de uma reflexão crítica do debate contemporâneo sobre as diversas concepções de liberdade procurando reflectir sobre o tipo de justiça e de liberdade que se deseja e acredita serem razoáveis numa sociedade democrática de direito e quais as respecitvas consequências no sistema de protecção dos direitos económicos e sociais.
A nossa abordadgem passa ainda por (i) uma leitura dos direitos económicos e sociais inserida na estrutura de valores das escolhas sociais que parte de uma reformulação da visão tradicional da economia de bem-estar, desenvolvida por Amartya Sen, e da sua releitura de acordo com uma perspectiva normativa que procura introduzir julgamentos de valor na análise de bem-estar e avaliar a liberdade-inclusiva como aquela que não pode senão corresponder ao reconhecimento e exercício pelos indivíduos de direitos mínimos; e (ii) uma proposta de construção do conteúdo essencial daqueles direitos por meio da inserção no tratamento das respectivas possibilidades de realização da abordagem das capabilities, e da sua interpretação como o espaço de direitos e prerrogativas que determina o conjunto de oportunidades de concretização das condições de liberdade, igualdade e dignidade de cada indivíduo.
Por fim, verificadas as possibilidades de realização judicial a nossa investigação culmina com as respostas à questão de saber até que ponto capability approach se pode afigurar como um padrão justificiável para os direitos económicos e sociais, quais as suas possibilidades e limites e que considerações poderão auxiliar o julgador no processo de tomada de decisão.
The aim of this essay is to address the possibilities for judicial protection of economic and social rights by inquiring what type of norms/guidelines can be extracted from the constitutionally enshrined model for those rights, and seeking to answer the question regarding what kind of obligations and rights can be withdrawn from said constitutional design. Considering the consequences that the judicial enforcement of these rights has at the level of public policies, our approach seeks to assess the extent to which it is Courts’ role to accommodate concerns and revindications arising from those rights, if they can directly extract from the respective norms rights to performance, and to coercively determine its implementation, and what criteria can or should guide the judge in the corresponding decision-making process. Our approach starts with a critical analysis of the contemporary debate of the different conceptions of liberty, seeking to reflect on the type of justice and freedom that is desired and believed to be reasonable in a democratic society and what are the respective consequences for the system of protection of economic and social rights. Our analysis also involves (i) a reading of economic and social rights inserted in the structure of social choices values whose starting point is a reformulation of the traditional view of the welfare economics, developed by Amartya Sen, and its reinterpretation according to a normative perspective that seeks to introduce value judgments in the well-being analysis and evaluate freedom-inclusive as corresponding to the recognition and exercise by individuals of minimum rights; and (ii) a proposal of construction of the minimum core content of those rights through the insertion of the capabilities approach on its analysis, and its interpretation as the space of rights and prerogatives that determines the set of opportunities for realizing the conditions of freedom, equality and dignity for each individual. Finally, once the possibilities for judicial adjudication are verified, our analysis culminates with the answers to the question concerning how far the capability approach appears as a justifiable standard for economic and social rights, what are its possibilities and limits and what considerations may assist the judge in the decision-making process.
The aim of this essay is to address the possibilities for judicial protection of economic and social rights by inquiring what type of norms/guidelines can be extracted from the constitutionally enshrined model for those rights, and seeking to answer the question regarding what kind of obligations and rights can be withdrawn from said constitutional design. Considering the consequences that the judicial enforcement of these rights has at the level of public policies, our approach seeks to assess the extent to which it is Courts’ role to accommodate concerns and revindications arising from those rights, if they can directly extract from the respective norms rights to performance, and to coercively determine its implementation, and what criteria can or should guide the judge in the corresponding decision-making process. Our approach starts with a critical analysis of the contemporary debate of the different conceptions of liberty, seeking to reflect on the type of justice and freedom that is desired and believed to be reasonable in a democratic society and what are the respective consequences for the system of protection of economic and social rights. Our analysis also involves (i) a reading of economic and social rights inserted in the structure of social choices values whose starting point is a reformulation of the traditional view of the welfare economics, developed by Amartya Sen, and its reinterpretation according to a normative perspective that seeks to introduce value judgments in the well-being analysis and evaluate freedom-inclusive as corresponding to the recognition and exercise by individuals of minimum rights; and (ii) a proposal of construction of the minimum core content of those rights through the insertion of the capabilities approach on its analysis, and its interpretation as the space of rights and prerogatives that determines the set of opportunities for realizing the conditions of freedom, equality and dignity for each individual. Finally, once the possibilities for judicial adjudication are verified, our analysis culminates with the answers to the question concerning how far the capability approach appears as a justifiable standard for economic and social rights, what are its possibilities and limits and what considerations may assist the judge in the decision-making process.
Description
Keywords
Liberdade, igualdade e dignidade Justiciabilidade Capacidades, funcionamentos (capability and functionings) e bens primários Conteúdo mínimo/essencial e conteúdo justiciável Reserva do possível, custos e trunfos contra a maioria Desacordos, legitimação democrática e controlo judicial Liberty, equality and dignity Justiciability Capability and functionings and primary goods Minimum/essential core and justiciable content Rights subject to progressive realisation within state’s available possibilities and resources, costs and trumps Desagreements, democratic legitimacy and judicial review