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Abstract(s)
O custo de manutenção do capital social tem sido um dos temas mais debatidos nos vários ordenamentos jurídicos europeus. Numa perspetiva nacional a discussão prende-se com a possibilidade de responsabilizar o sócio por não capitalizar adequadamente a sociedade, defendendo que o sócio, mais do que ninguém, conhecerá o objeto social que visa desenvolver e, portanto, será o único capaz de fazer uma correta dotação do acervo patrimonial necessário para iniciar a sua ideia de negócio. Esta premissa define o início da nossa investigação, e com a mesma, pretendemos realçar que o desenvolvimento doutrinal da subcapitalização desmerece a existência de uma estrutura de capitais que se encontra inerente a qualquer decisão de financiamento, esquecendo, de igual modo, que a escolha dos recursos de capital é uma decisão que cabe à administração. Reconhecendo, ainda, a incapacidade de proteção do capital social, e relembrando que este mínimo legal, enquanto cifra de retenção, estabelece restrições no regime de distribuição de dividendos, demonstramos os possíveis benefícios de um regime solvency-based, que se tem demonstrado mais eficiente, dado às ausências de restrições na política financeira e dada a capacidade de assegurar a unidade entre as políticas de financiamento, investimento e dividendos. Em último lugar, fazemos uma breve análise dos clausulados contratuais utilizados pelo credor forte, como forma de mitigar o risco associado ao incumprimento, refletindo, ainda, a possibilidade de os credores fracos aproveitarem essa mesma proteção através do fenómeno do free ride.
The cost of maintaining a minimum legal Capital in Europe has been one of the main topics of concern within Europe’s legal system. Nationally the discussion growths within the possibility to take shareholders liable for undercapitalization of the corporation, believing that shareholders have to invest the amount of capital that the business needs to develop it´s activity. This premise was the starting point of our research where we underlined that the problem thought this way disregards the existence of a capital structure and also in a financial point of view it doesn’t take in account that the choice of capital resources is left to manager’s decision. Recognizing the inability of legal capital to protect creditors, reminding that legal capital as a fund settles a restriction on dividends distribution, we highline the benefits of a possible conversion to a solvency-based regime as it has proven to be more efficient mainly because of the absence of legal capital restrictions on financial policies and it´s ability (by only imposing insolvency limitations) to preserve the linkage between finance, investment and dividend policies. We also make a brief analysis of the contractual set up between debt parties, in specific the ability of a creditor to defend himself with covenants and the possibility of weak creditors to free ride.
The cost of maintaining a minimum legal Capital in Europe has been one of the main topics of concern within Europe’s legal system. Nationally the discussion growths within the possibility to take shareholders liable for undercapitalization of the corporation, believing that shareholders have to invest the amount of capital that the business needs to develop it´s activity. This premise was the starting point of our research where we underlined that the problem thought this way disregards the existence of a capital structure and also in a financial point of view it doesn’t take in account that the choice of capital resources is left to manager’s decision. Recognizing the inability of legal capital to protect creditors, reminding that legal capital as a fund settles a restriction on dividends distribution, we highline the benefits of a possible conversion to a solvency-based regime as it has proven to be more efficient mainly because of the absence of legal capital restrictions on financial policies and it´s ability (by only imposing insolvency limitations) to preserve the linkage between finance, investment and dividend policies. We also make a brief analysis of the contractual set up between debt parties, in specific the ability of a creditor to defend himself with covenants and the possibility of weak creditors to free ride.
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Keywords
Subcapitalização Políticas financeiras Debt Governance Undercapitalization Financial policies Debt governance