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Abstract(s)
O Direito da Concorrência Europeu, na sua essência, viu os seus alicerces serem
construídos com o Tratado de Roma, de 1957. Desde então muitas foram as evoluções
económicas que se assistiram a nível mundial, principalmente com a introdução da
Internet e a Nova Economia.
As características que envolvem a Nova Economia são muitos díspares das da
economia tradicional e, como tal, levantam desafios para os quais o Direito atual não está
preparado para responder. Prova disto é a desatualização do artigo 102º do TFUE às
indústrias high-tech, sendo difícil aplicar os seus critérios tradicionais de identificação do
mercado relevante e de posição dominante ao mercado atual.
Com o caso Google vimos que é possível a União Europeia produzir decisões que
alcancem plataformas bilaterais, tendo a Comissão identificado o abuso da posição
dominante daquele no mercado relevante. Resultado oposto teve a decisão do caso
Google na EUA, fruto dos diferentes métodos de apreciação dos factos do caso,
concluindo a FTC que a empresa não tinha abusado da sua posição dominante ao nível
dos motores de busca.
The European Antitrust Law, in its core, saw its foundations built with the Rome Treaty in 1957. Since then, many were the economical evolutions that took place in the world, especially with the origin of the Internet and the New Economy. The New Economy characteristics are very different from the ones of the traditional economy and, as such, pose challenges for which the present Law is not ready to take on. The lack of actualization of the article 102º of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to high-tech industries is proof of that, making it difficult to apply its traditional criteria when defining the relevant market and market power in today’s world. With the Google case we were able to see that the European Union is able to make decisions regarding bilateral platforms, having come to the conclusion that Google abused its market power in the relevant market. An opposite result was achieved in the EUA concerning the Google case, due to the different ways of analyzing the case, concluding the FTC that the company did not abuse its market power at the search engine level.
The European Antitrust Law, in its core, saw its foundations built with the Rome Treaty in 1957. Since then, many were the economical evolutions that took place in the world, especially with the origin of the Internet and the New Economy. The New Economy characteristics are very different from the ones of the traditional economy and, as such, pose challenges for which the present Law is not ready to take on. The lack of actualization of the article 102º of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to high-tech industries is proof of that, making it difficult to apply its traditional criteria when defining the relevant market and market power in today’s world. With the Google case we were able to see that the European Union is able to make decisions regarding bilateral platforms, having come to the conclusion that Google abused its market power in the relevant market. An opposite result was achieved in the EUA concerning the Google case, due to the different ways of analyzing the case, concluding the FTC that the company did not abuse its market power at the search engine level.
Description
Keywords
Nova economia Mercado relevante Abuso de posição dominante Motor de pesquisa Plataformas bilaterais New economy Relevant market Abuse of market power Google Search engine Bilateral platforms