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O Tratado de Lisboa introduziu alterações às regras para a escolha do Presidente da Comissão estabelecendo que este passaria a ser eleito pelo Parlamento Europeu, sob proposta do Conselho Europeu. Foi neste contexto institucional que os partidos políticos europeus tomaram a iniciativa de apresentarem candidatos ao lugar de Presidente da Comissão Europeia, antes das eleições europeias de 2014. Esse procedimento, que não estava expressamente previsto no Tratado, tinha para os seus defensores o objetivo de criar uma maior ligação entre as eleições para o Parlamento Europeu e a escolha do Presidente da Comissão, de forma a aumentar o interesse nas eleições e a conferir maior legitimidade e democraticidade ao processo de escolha do Presidente da Comissão Europeia. Na prossecução desse desiderato, os partidos políticos europeus foram incentivados pelo Parlamento Europeu e pela Comissão. Desde há muito que, no debate político e académico, se discute o chamado défice democrático da União Europeia, quais são as suas causas e quais as formas mais adequadas para o resolver. Os posicionamentos assumidos em relação a esta matéria são em grande medida reveladores das perspetivas políticas ou das teorias da integração europeia privilegiadas, as quais podemos dividir em dois grandes campos: supranacionalismo e intergovernamentalismo. Desde há algum tempo, que uma corrente de académicos parte de uma perspetiva supranacionalista para defender uma maior politização e uma maior ligação das eleições europeias com a escolha de um poder executivo europeu, como forma de responder ao défice democrático. Este trabalho pretende analisar se esse objetivo foi de facto alcançado nas eleições para o Parlamento Europeu de 2014 e se esse será o caminho mais adequado para reforçar a legitimidade e a democracia numa entidade política com as características da União Europeia.
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced changes to the rules for the election of the President of the Commission, stating that he would be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the European Council. It was in this institutional context that European political parties took the initiative to present candidates for the post of President of the European Commission before the European elections of 2014. This procedure, which was not expressly provided for in the Treaty, had for its defenders the objective of creating a greater link between the European Parliament elections and the choice of the President of the Commission in order to increase the interest in the elections and to confer greater legitimacy and democraticity in the process of choosing the President of the European Commission. In pursuit of this aim, the European political parties were encouraged by the European Parliament and the Commission. The political and academic debate has long discussed the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union, its causes and the most appropriate ways of solving it. The positions taken on this subject are largely revealing of the political perspectives or the privileged European integration theories, which we can divide into two broad fields: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. For some time now, an academic trend has come from a supranationalist perspective, to advocate for greater politicization and closer links between the European elections and the choice of a European executive as a way of responding to the democratic deficit. This thesis aims to analyze whether this objective has in fact been achieved in the 2014 European Parliament elections and whether this will be the most appropriate path to strengthen legitimacy and democracy in a polity with the characteristics of the European Union.
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced changes to the rules for the election of the President of the Commission, stating that he would be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the European Council. It was in this institutional context that European political parties took the initiative to present candidates for the post of President of the European Commission before the European elections of 2014. This procedure, which was not expressly provided for in the Treaty, had for its defenders the objective of creating a greater link between the European Parliament elections and the choice of the President of the Commission in order to increase the interest in the elections and to confer greater legitimacy and democraticity in the process of choosing the President of the European Commission. In pursuit of this aim, the European political parties were encouraged by the European Parliament and the Commission. The political and academic debate has long discussed the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union, its causes and the most appropriate ways of solving it. The positions taken on this subject are largely revealing of the political perspectives or the privileged European integration theories, which we can divide into two broad fields: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. For some time now, an academic trend has come from a supranationalist perspective, to advocate for greater politicization and closer links between the European elections and the choice of a European executive as a way of responding to the democratic deficit. This thesis aims to analyze whether this objective has in fact been achieved in the 2014 European Parliament elections and whether this will be the most appropriate path to strengthen legitimacy and democracy in a polity with the characteristics of the European Union.