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Abstract(s)
A presente investigação pretende aprofundar a forma como os vários Estados-Membros perseguem os seus objetivos domésticos dentro da União Europeia, mais especificamente, de que
forma tentam atingir os interesses da sua nação durante as negociações para a aplicação do
Orçamento de longo prazo. Para esta análise, foi escolhida como caso de estudo a negociação
de Portugal para o Orçamento de longo prazo da União Europeia para 2021-2027, dividindo-se
a abordagem em 3 grandes partes. A primeira parte compõe a revisão de literatura das grandes
teorias das relações internacionais relacionadas com os interesses nacionais no contexto europeu, bem como sobre as negociações do Orçamento de longo prazo da União Europeia e dos
interesses nacionais dos Estados-Membros no contexto destas negociações. A segunda parte
resume os procedimentos que conduziram as negociações do Orçamento de longo prazo até à
aceitação final do mesmo, detalhando o fluxo do processo, as suas várias fases de desenvolvimento e os respetivos intervenientes. No terceiro momento, incindindo sobre o caso de estudo
escolhido, é aplicada a teoria de jogo de dois níveis de Putnam (1988), onde são analisados os
interesses nacionais de Portugal, bem como as diferentes estratégias observadas no decurso das
negociações. Através desta opção foi possível recriar o processo de negociação tendo em conta
os vários objetivos discutidos bem como as diferentes posições negociais, nomeadamente a
defesa da posição negocial portuguesa durante o processo de negociações. Dando resposta às
hipóteses de investigação foi possível concluir sobre a questão de partida, examinando até que
ponto os interesses nacionais de Portugal estão refletidos no resultado final do Orçamento de
longo prazo da UE para 2021-2027.
The following research intends to deepen the Member States’ strategy to pursue their domestic preferences within the context of the European Union. More specifically, how they try to achieve their nation’s interests during the negotiations for the European Union's long-term budget. For this analysis it was chosen Portugal’s negotiations of the EU’s long-term budget 2021-2027 as a case study. The research is divided into 3 major parts, the first being a literature review on the theories of international relations related to the national preferences in the European context, as well as the negotiations of the long-term budget of the European Union and the domestic preferences of the Member States. The second part summarizes the negotiation’s framework of the European long-term budget, providing details related to the process flow, its different phases and multiple participants. Finally, on the third moment, to undertake the analysis of the chosen case study, Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory was applied in order to analyse the national preferences of Portugal as well as the different strategies observed during the negotiations for the European long-term budget. This method was used to recreate the negotiation framework taking into account the specific framework of the long-term EU budget’s negotiations and the Portuguese negotiations’ tactic to pursue their national preferences. Considering the research hypotheses, it was possible to answer the research question, providing an evaluation on whether Portugal's national preferences are reflected in the final result of the EU's long-term budget for 2021-2027.
The following research intends to deepen the Member States’ strategy to pursue their domestic preferences within the context of the European Union. More specifically, how they try to achieve their nation’s interests during the negotiations for the European Union's long-term budget. For this analysis it was chosen Portugal’s negotiations of the EU’s long-term budget 2021-2027 as a case study. The research is divided into 3 major parts, the first being a literature review on the theories of international relations related to the national preferences in the European context, as well as the negotiations of the long-term budget of the European Union and the domestic preferences of the Member States. The second part summarizes the negotiation’s framework of the European long-term budget, providing details related to the process flow, its different phases and multiple participants. Finally, on the third moment, to undertake the analysis of the chosen case study, Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory was applied in order to analyse the national preferences of Portugal as well as the different strategies observed during the negotiations for the European long-term budget. This method was used to recreate the negotiation framework taking into account the specific framework of the long-term EU budget’s negotiations and the Portuguese negotiations’ tactic to pursue their national preferences. Considering the research hypotheses, it was possible to answer the research question, providing an evaluation on whether Portugal's national preferences are reflected in the final result of the EU's long-term budget for 2021-2027.
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Keywords
Interesses nacionais Negociações Orçamento Teoria de jogos National preferences Negotiations EU budget Game theory