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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Durante mais de três quartos de século, conforme começamos por evidenciar, subscritores e críticos da perspectiva politológica do totalitarismo, sob um véu superficial de dissensão ou distanciamento, nunca deixaram de veicular o mesmíssimo argumento analítico sobre as motivações, dinâmicas, resultados e horizontes que definiriam um regime totalitário – um tipo de regime, pretende tal argumento, fadado à auto-destruição. Aprimorando e aplicando metodologia de investigação histórico-comparativa aos casos do Estalinismo e do Nazismo, demonstramos como o argumento supracitado, no grosso e na nata, carece de fundamentação histórico-empírica; e descobrimos um argumento alternativo, tão fundamentado quanto refrescante, passível de contribuir para revitalizar uma tradição de estudos, no que há de mais essencial, há muito estagnada.
As we begin by documenting, for more than three quarters of a century, both proponents and critics of the category of totalitarianism, whatever their claims, ended up repeating the very same analytical argument on what motivations, dynamics, outcomes and horizons would define a totalitarian regime – a type of regime, so goes such argument, irrevocably condemned to self-destruction. By upgrading and applying historical-comparative research methodology to the cases of Stalinism and Nazism, we prove such an argument to be, for the most part, lacking in historical-empirical grounding; and formulate an alternative interpretation of the essence of totalitarian rule that, for its grounding and freshness, could breathe new life into the mostly ossified study of the subject.
As we begin by documenting, for more than three quarters of a century, both proponents and critics of the category of totalitarianism, whatever their claims, ended up repeating the very same analytical argument on what motivations, dynamics, outcomes and horizons would define a totalitarian regime – a type of regime, so goes such argument, irrevocably condemned to self-destruction. By upgrading and applying historical-comparative research methodology to the cases of Stalinism and Nazism, we prove such an argument to be, for the most part, lacking in historical-empirical grounding; and formulate an alternative interpretation of the essence of totalitarian rule that, for its grounding and freshness, could breathe new life into the mostly ossified study of the subject.