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Abstract(s)
A presente dissertação versa sobre a estipulação de voto plural na sociedade anónima – um dos temas centrais
do corporate governance moderno é precisamente o papel, mais ou menos protagonista, dos acionistas na
governação da sociedade anónima e, em particular, da sociedade cotada – e sobre a relevância que deve ser
atribuída ao princípio one share, one vote num contexto de profundas alterações na forma como se organiza o
governo societário moderno. Desde a aprovação do CSC, em 1986, que a estipulação de voto plural na
sociedade anónima era entre nós proibida. Foi, no entanto, recentemente aprovada (ainda na generalidade e
sujeita a votação final) uma revisão do CVM que inclui uma regra habilitadora da emissão de ações de
categoria especial com voto plural – até ao limite de cinco votos por ação – para as sociedades cotadas (ou
para sociedades que estejam em processo de admissão à cotação). A introdução desta regra significa uma
profunda modificação – embora não generalizável a todas as sociedades anónimas – da norma tradicional entre
nós, assim aproximando o regime nacional de jurisdições como a norte-americana, a inglesa, a francesa e a
italiana. Analisaremos neste trabalho como se desenvolveu cada um desses regimes e como deve, hoje, ser
perspetivada a opção de cada um dos legisladores. De um dos lados da barricada estão aqueles que consideram
que os sistemas de voto plural geram os incentivos errados de governo, nomeadamente ao nível da extração e
apropriação de vantagens privadas de controlo, e induzem a formação de estruturas acionistas em que o market
for corporate control não funciona adequadamente; de outro, estão aqueles que afirmam que se trata, antes de
mais, de um tema de liberdade (que a geografia acaba por resolver, uma vez que, existindo jurisdições com
maior liberdade que outras, ocorre um fenómeno natural de deslocalização para as primeiras, que, não
acidentalmente, são na maior parte dos casos as que têm mercados mais profundos e eficientes) e de resposta
a problemas sérios de governo societário, como sejam, por exemplo, aqueles causados por acionistas ativistas
e investidores ancorados a estratégias muitas vezes oportunistas e de curto prazo, ao mesmo tempo que
permitem criar maiorias estáveis, focadas em objetivos de médio e longo prazo, que se refletem em
administrações também estáveis e alinhadas com a visão dos promotores. Trata-se de um debate que, no
entanto, não é binário – há um espaço intermédio em que o voto plural pode ser regulado, os abusos podem
ser prevenidos e, afinal, o voto plural pode ser o catalisador para um conjunto de consequências positivas, sem
que estas importem, na mesma ou em maior medida, necessárias consequências negativas. Teremos ocasião
de verificar que o legislador nacional nem sempre soube aprender com as lições da história na construção das
soluções adotadas.
This dissertation deals with multiple voting rights shares – one of the most important debates of modern corporate governance concerns the role of shareholders in the balance of power of joint-stock companies and of publicly traded companies – and with the relative relevance of the “one share, one vote” principle in a context where modern corporate governance is changing profoundly and dramatically. Since 1986, with the enactment of the Companies’ Code, multiple voting rights shares were not allowed in Portugal for joint-stock companies. However, in the context of a recent global revision of the Securities’ Code (still subject to a final vote in Parliament), the possibility of issuing multiple voting rights shares – with up to five votes per share – in the case of listed companies (or companies on the process for listing) was approved, hence changing radically the traditional rule and therefore putting the Portuguese regime closer to countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, or Italy. An historical and critical analysis of the evolution of regulation in these systems is performed to put in perspective the option of each jurisdiction. On opposite sides of the fence, 4 we have those that believe multiple voting rights create the wrong set of governance incentives, in particular on what concerns the extraction of private benefits of control, and contribute for the creation of legal structures and vehicles in which the market for control is highly inefficient, and those who believe this issue is above all a matter of economic and legal freedom (that geographic distance ends up solving in practical terms because of issues such as regulatory competition and the attraction of new investment by deeper and more liquid capital markets) and of response to important problems of corporate governance such as those caused by activist and opportunistic investors with short term strategies. Simultaneously, such solutions align the incentives for coherent majorities among shareholders, and stable boards of directors, focused on medium and long-term goals. We will reach the conclusion that this is a non-binary debate – there is room for a proper and articulated regulation of multiple voting rights shares, in a way that can prevent its abuses and promote multiple voting rights as a catalyst for several positive results without the symmetrical negative effects. However, the Portuguese regulator did not learn all lessons of history with the new regime.
This dissertation deals with multiple voting rights shares – one of the most important debates of modern corporate governance concerns the role of shareholders in the balance of power of joint-stock companies and of publicly traded companies – and with the relative relevance of the “one share, one vote” principle in a context where modern corporate governance is changing profoundly and dramatically. Since 1986, with the enactment of the Companies’ Code, multiple voting rights shares were not allowed in Portugal for joint-stock companies. However, in the context of a recent global revision of the Securities’ Code (still subject to a final vote in Parliament), the possibility of issuing multiple voting rights shares – with up to five votes per share – in the case of listed companies (or companies on the process for listing) was approved, hence changing radically the traditional rule and therefore putting the Portuguese regime closer to countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, or Italy. An historical and critical analysis of the evolution of regulation in these systems is performed to put in perspective the option of each jurisdiction. On opposite sides of the fence, 4 we have those that believe multiple voting rights create the wrong set of governance incentives, in particular on what concerns the extraction of private benefits of control, and contribute for the creation of legal structures and vehicles in which the market for control is highly inefficient, and those who believe this issue is above all a matter of economic and legal freedom (that geographic distance ends up solving in practical terms because of issues such as regulatory competition and the attraction of new investment by deeper and more liquid capital markets) and of response to important problems of corporate governance such as those caused by activist and opportunistic investors with short term strategies. Simultaneously, such solutions align the incentives for coherent majorities among shareholders, and stable boards of directors, focused on medium and long-term goals. We will reach the conclusion that this is a non-binary debate – there is room for a proper and articulated regulation of multiple voting rights shares, in a way that can prevent its abuses and promote multiple voting rights as a catalyst for several positive results without the symmetrical negative effects. However, the Portuguese regulator did not learn all lessons of history with the new regime.
Description
Keywords
Voto plural Ações de lealdade “Uma ação, um voto” Direito de voto dos acionistas Direitos dos acionistas Assembleia geral Corporate governance Multiple voting rights shares Loyalty shares “One share, one vote” Shareholder voting rights Shareholder rights Shareholders meeting