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Authors
Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
A presente dissertação de mestrado centra-se em uma das dimensões do dever de lealdade (duty of loyalty) dos administradores: a de estes não poderem apropriar, para si ou para terceiros, oportunidades de negócio societárias. Estamos assim perante um conflito de interesses que deve ser evitado por parte do administrador. Este dever juntamente com o dever de cuidado (duty of care) estão consagrados legalmente no 64.º, n.º1, do CSC. A densificação da figura será conseguida através do estudo de direito comparado (EUA, Inglaterra, Alemanha e Espanha) útil para a análise do seu regime jurídico.
This proposed dissertation focuses on one of the dimensions of the director’s duty of loyalty: the dimension that stands for the prohibition of appropriation of corporate opportunities, both for themselves and for third parties. We are therefore faced with a conflict of interests that must be avoided by the director. This duty coupled with the duty of care is legally disciplined in the article 64º, number 1, of the CSC. The densification of the figure will be achieved through comparative law study (USA, England, Germany and Spain) which will be quite useful for the analysis of the legal regime.
This proposed dissertation focuses on one of the dimensions of the director’s duty of loyalty: the dimension that stands for the prohibition of appropriation of corporate opportunities, both for themselves and for third parties. We are therefore faced with a conflict of interests that must be avoided by the director. This duty coupled with the duty of care is legally disciplined in the article 64º, number 1, of the CSC. The densification of the figure will be achieved through comparative law study (USA, England, Germany and Spain) which will be quite useful for the analysis of the legal regime.