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Enquanto o recurso aos ‘soldados da fortuna’ acompanha a humanidade desde tempos imemoriais, a privatização da guerra, stricto sensu, afigura-se como um fenómeno inovador, manifestação latente do capitalismo global. A complexidade, a dinâmica e a abrangência que lhe estão associadas são tais que, no novo milénio, se afiguram capazes de retratar a evolução contemporânea dos conflitos armados, alastrando-se os seus efeitos não só à regulação jurídica das guerras do presente, mas também às inflexões de rumo tomadas pelas relações internacionais. Uma vez demonstrada a dissonância normativa face ao jus in bello que, idealmente, se lhes aplica, urge discernir os desafios colocados por Empresas Militares e de Segurança Privada (EMSP) destituídas de personalidade jurídica. Que desafios apresentará este novo ciclo privatístico, o qual, orbitando ao redor do Kremlin, assenta numa existência orgânica, premeditadamente envolta pela ilegalidade? Qual a efetiva relação destes grupos ‘privados’ com o governo russo e a política externa de Moscovo, e como responsabilizar internacionalmente o segundo pelos atos dos primeiros? Precedendo o momento sancionatório – tendencialmente pós-conflitual e necessariamente multidimensional – as regras de imputação assumem centralidade incontornável, determinando a Responsabilidade Internacional dos Estados. Convocando jurisprudência dissonante, o caso do Grupo Wagner renova os termos e o contexto do debate, perante o ‘vácuo’ de responsabilidade que os Estados visam, por todos os meios, criar: demonstrando as limitações do controlo efetivo, padrão preferido pelo TIJ, e (re)legitimando o critério do controlo global, cunhado pelo TPEJ.
While recourse to 'soldiers of fortune' has been with humanity since time immemorial, the privatization of war, stricto sensu, emerges as an innovative phenomenon, simmering manifestation of global capitalism. Its complexity, dynamics and scope are such that, in the new millennium, it seems capable of portraying the contemporary evolution of armed conflicts, with its effects spreading not only to the legal regulation of present-day wars, but also to the changes of course taken by international relations. Once the dissonance is demonstrated with respect to jus in bello norms that, ideally, apply to them, it is urgent to discern the challenges posed by Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) devoid of legal personality. What challenges will this new privatization cycle present, which surrounds the Kremlin and is based on an organic existence, premeditatedly shrouded by illegality? What is the effective relationship of these 'private' groups with the Russian government and Moscow's foreign policy, and how can the latter be held internationally responsible for the acts of the former? Preceding the sanctioning moment – usually post-conflict and necessarily multidimensional – rules of attribution assume an unavoidable centrality, determining the International Responsibility of States. Convening dissenting jurisprudence, the Wagner Group case renews the terms and context of the debate, before the responsibility gap that States seek to create by all means. Hence, it demonstrates the limitations of the ICJ preferred effective control standard, whilst (re)legitimizes the broader ICTY overall control test.
While recourse to 'soldiers of fortune' has been with humanity since time immemorial, the privatization of war, stricto sensu, emerges as an innovative phenomenon, simmering manifestation of global capitalism. Its complexity, dynamics and scope are such that, in the new millennium, it seems capable of portraying the contemporary evolution of armed conflicts, with its effects spreading not only to the legal regulation of present-day wars, but also to the changes of course taken by international relations. Once the dissonance is demonstrated with respect to jus in bello norms that, ideally, apply to them, it is urgent to discern the challenges posed by Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) devoid of legal personality. What challenges will this new privatization cycle present, which surrounds the Kremlin and is based on an organic existence, premeditatedly shrouded by illegality? What is the effective relationship of these 'private' groups with the Russian government and Moscow's foreign policy, and how can the latter be held internationally responsible for the acts of the former? Preceding the sanctioning moment – usually post-conflict and necessarily multidimensional – rules of attribution assume an unavoidable centrality, determining the International Responsibility of States. Convening dissenting jurisprudence, the Wagner Group case renews the terms and context of the debate, before the responsibility gap that States seek to create by all means. Hence, it demonstrates the limitations of the ICJ preferred effective control standard, whilst (re)legitimizes the broader ICTY overall control test.
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Privatização da guerra Empresas militares e de segurança privada Direito internacional humanitário Rússia Wagner Yevgeny Prigozhin Responsabilidade internacional dos estados Imputação Controlo Diligência devida Privatization of war Private military and security companies International humanitarian law Russia International responsibility of states Attribution Control Due diligence