| Name: | Description: | Size: | Format: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 698.29 KB | Adobe PDF |
Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the com-
petitive e§ects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to quantify
the coordinated e§ects of such acquisitions on di§erentiated products industries, by evaluating the
impact of such acquisitions on the minimum discount factors for which coordination can be sustained.
The methodology can deal with settings involving all type of owners and ownership rights: owners
that can be internal to the industry (rival Örms) and external to the industry; and ownership rights
that can involve Önancial interests and corporate control, can be direct and indirect, can be partial
or full. We provide an empirical application of our proposed methodology to several acquisitions
in the wet shaving industry that give rise to cross- and common-ownership structures. The results
seem to suggest that the incentives of (i) the acquiring partyís Örm to coordinate are non-decreasing
after an acquisition (independently of whether it involves full or partial Önancial or corporate control
rights, by internal or external owners), (ii) the acquired Örm to coordinate are non-decreasing after
acquisitions involving full or partial corporate control rights, but non-increasing after acquisitions
involving full or partial Önancial rights, and (iii) the remaining Örms in the industry to coordinate
are non-increasing after an acquisition (again, independently of whether it involves full or partial
Önancial or corporate control rights, by internal or external owners).
Description
Keywords
Antitrust Coordinated Efects Partial Acquisitions Oligopoly Diferentiated Products Demand Estimation
Pedagogical Context
Citation
Brito, D., Ribeiro, R., Vasconcelos, H. (2017). Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions. Working papers: Economics. N.º 1, 74 p.