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- Global bifurcation mechanism and local stability of identical and equidistant regionsPublication . Gaspar, José; Ikeda, Kiyohiro; Onda, MikihasaWe provide an analytical description of possible spatial patterns in economic geography models with three identical and equidistant regions by applying results from General Bifurcation mechanisms. We then use Pflüger’s (2004, Reg Sci Urb Econ) model to show what spatial patterns can be uncovered analytically. As the freeness of trade increases, a uniform distribution undergoes a direct bifurcation that leads to a state with two identical large regions and one small region. Before this bifurcation, the model encounters a minimum point above which a curve of dual equilibria with two small identical regions and one small region emerges. From further bifurcations, the equilibrium with one large region encounters agglomeration in a single region, while the equilibrium with one small region encounters a state with two evenly populated regions and one empty region. A secondary bifurcation then leads to partial agglomeration with one small region and one large region. We show that an asymmetric equilibrium with populated regions cannot be connected with other types of equilibria. Therefore, an initially asymmetric state will remain so and preserve the ordering between region sizes.
- Modeling horizontal shareholding with ownership dispersionPublication . Brito, Duarte; Elhauge, Einer; Ribeiro, Ricardo; Vasconcelos, HelderThe dominantformulationformodelingtheobjectivefunctionofmanagersofcompeting rms withhorizontalshareholdinghasbeencritiquedforproducingtheresultthat,ifnon-horizontal shareholdersarehighlydispersed,managerswouldmimictheinterestsofhorizontalsharehold- ers eveniftheyownashareofthe rmthatdoesnotinducefullcontrol.Weshowthatthis issuecanbeavoided(whilemaintainingtheremainingfeaturesofthedominantapproach) withanalternativeformulationthatisderivedfromaprobabilisticvotingmodelthatassumes shareholderswithhigher nancialstakeswilltakegreaterinterestinthemanagerialactions, whichyieldstheresultthatmanagersmaximizeacontrol-weightedsumoftheshareholders relativereturns.
- Two-group classification in business: an evaluation of parametric and non-parametric approachesPublication . Silva, A. Pedro Duarte; Stam, Antonie; Neter, John
- All managers have a theory of the firmPublication . Santos, José Fernando Pinto dos
- Fusões e aquisições: a evidência empíricaPublication . Rodrigues, Vasco
- Efficient screening of variable subsets in multivariate statistical modelsPublication . Silva, A. Pedro Duarte
- Endogenous mergers and market structurePublication . Rodrigues, VascoIn this paper we use a two-stage game to model endogenous mergers. In the second stage of the game, firms compete on the product market. In the first stage, anticipating what will happen in the second stage, firms decide whether or not to merge. In the model, merger occurrence is determined by the interplay of the initial number of firms in the industry, the expected competitive intensity, and the possibility to economize on fixed costs through merger. It is shown that the equilibrium market structure concentration is decreasing in the first of these factors and increasing in the other two. Some implications for antitrust policy are discussed
- Non-radial efficiency measurement: a review and new insights for free disposal hull technologiesPublication . Portela, Maria Conceição A. Silva; Borges, Pedro Castro
- A game theoretical model of land contract choicePublication . Mendes, AméricoIn most of the land tenancy literature the type of contract is exogenous. Also even though these contracts vary a lot among farms, between regions and over time, the theoretical literature has not always acknowledged this idiosyncrasy. Building on the strategic bargaining theory initiated by Rubinstein, this model not only makes the type of contract endogenous, but also provides the surplus sharing rules and the conditions giving rise to each type of contract, showing how the type and terms of the contract are tailored to fit the characteristics of the parties and their economic environment. Pairwise bargaining is embedded into a market context by putting “competitive pressure” on the players through the opportunity they have to break up bargaining and look for alternative partners. Because of this threat of opting out, the outcome of the bargaining process depends not only on the characteristics of the players, but also on events outside their match and the information they have about them. The model departs from price-taking assumptions. Type and terms of the contract result from negotiation and are shaped by the “relative bargaining powers” of the players whose relevant components are identified in a precise way in the model.
- Forest owners’ collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approachPublication . Mendes, AméricoThis paper is a follow up on a earlier one (Mendes, 1998) where I proposed a series of models for forest owners associations represented as organisation made up of two groups of strategically interacting players: the forest owners who are members of the association and the board of directors they have elected. The directors decide on the amount of services provided by the association which can be public goods (collective representation of the members, promotion of their common interests, diffusion of general information about forest programmes and best forest management practices, etc.) and private goods and services (silvicultural works preventive of forest fires, technical advice, etc.). The models were set up as games in strategic form with complete information and no payoff uncertainty. Here I pick up the second of, what is called in that previous paper, the "Portuguese" models and extend it in the following directions: - there is payoff risk for the forest owners due to exogenous hazards (forest fires or others); - forest owners can buy private services from the owners which contribute to reduce the losses resulting from those hazards. The main focus in this paper is to derive the comparative static results about the demand of these private services by the forest owners.