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- "Sorry, we're closed" bank branch closures, loan pricing, and information asymmetriesPublication . Bonfim, Diana; Nogueira, Gil; Ongena, StevenWe study local loan conditions when banks close branches. In places where branch closures do not take place, firms that purposely switch banks receive a sixty-three basis points (bps) discount. However, after the closure of nearby branches of their credit-granting banks, firms that locally and hurriedly transfer to other banks receive no such discount. Yet, the loan default rate for the latter (more expensive) transfer loans is on average a full percentage point lower than that for the former (cheaper) switching loans. This suggests that transfer firms are of "better"quality than switching firms. In sum, even if local markets remain competitive, when banks close branches, firms lose.
- Deposit insurance and cross-border banksPublication . Azevedo, João Valle e; Bonfim, Diana
- Liquidity risk and collective moral hazardPublication . Bonfim, Diana; Kim, MosheBanks individually optimize their liquidity risk manage-ment, often neglecting the externalities generated by their choices on the overall risk of the financial system. However, banks may have incentives to optimize their choices not strictly at the individual level, but engaging instead in collective risk-taking strategies. In this paper we look for evidence of such behaviors in the run-up to the global financial crisis. We find strong and robust evidence of peer effects in banks’ liquidity risk management. This suggests that incentives for collective risk-taking play a role in banks’ choices, thus calling for a macroprudential approach to liquidity regulation.