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  • Mergers of consumer cooperatives
    Publication . Khorasani, Sina; Korpeoglu, Gizem
    Problem definition: Consumer cooperatives are consumer-owned and managed enterprises that aim to achieve buyer power and maximize their members' welfare. Recently, several cooperatives in major economies, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, and Switzerland, have merged to increase their buyer power and provide lower prices for their members. We seek to understand how these mergers affect market outcomes and consumer welfare. Methodology/results: We build a game-theoretic model of a two-tier supply chain where multiple consumer cooperatives procure a product from a market on behalf of their member consumers. Multiple suppliers produce for this market and can increase their supply by incurring a scale-up cost. We show that mergers of cooperatives reduce the wholesale price, as intended. This enables consumers to allocate more of their income to purchasing other goods, which improves consumer welfare. However, the lower price also induces suppliers to reduce their production quantities, thereby causing each consumer to receive less of the supplied product, which reduces consumer welfare. We find that this underproduction is even more pronounced in industries with low scale-up costs. Thus, we show that mergers harm all consumers when the pre-merger number of cooperatives or the production scale-up cost is below a certain threshold. Otherwise, mergers benefit all consumers. We expand our results by considering horizontally and vertically differentiated cooperatives and show that our main results are robust. We also show that greater differentiation among cooperatives increases the benefit of mergers. Managerial implications: Mergers of cooperatives make a nuanced impact on consumer welfare due to their effect on wholesale prices and production incentives. Policymakers should maintain healthy competition among cooperatives to maximize consumer welfare, especially in markets with low production scale-up costs.
  • Barriers to social innovation
    Publication . Mendes, Américo M. S. Carvalho; Batista, António; Fernandes, Liliana; Macedo, Palmira; Pinto, Filipe; Rebelo, Luis; Ribeiro, Marta; Sottomayor, Miguel; Tavares, Marisa; Verdelho, Vítor
    A deliverable of the project: “The theoretical, empirical and policy foundations for building social innovation in Europe
  • The amazing geometry of price competition with quality dependent production costs
    Publication . Pires, Cesaltina Pacheco; Pinho, Joana; Jorge, Sílvia Ferreira; Catalão-Lopes, Margarida
    This paper provides a full characterization of price competition in a vertical differentiation model with quality dependent marginal production costs. For each vector of qualities, we determine the Nash equilibrium and show graphically the different market regions for different values of the lowest quality valuation parameter, which reveals an amazing geometry. Besides the classical cases of high-quality monopoly or duopoly with partial or full coverage, we show that, when the high-quality firm has a too high quality, the equilibrium is a low-quality monopoly. Moreover, for positive lowest quality valuation, there always exist interior and corner full coverage duopoly equilibria. On the contrary, partial coverage duopoly do not exist when the lowest consumers’ valuation of quality is high whereas high-quality monopoly are not possible for low values of lowest quality valuation. Our findings are the backbone of future analysis of quality choices and may be relevant for firms and policy makers.
  • The pricing of sustainable syndicated loans
    Publication . Alves, Paulo; Gonçalo, Jorge; Pinto, João M
    This paper provides a comparative analysis of sustainable and conventional syndicated loan spreads and pricing. Using a cross-section of 24,962 syndicated loan tranches closed between 2018 and 2022 in OECD countries, we show that sustainable and conventional loans are differently priced, spreads of sustainable versus conventional loans do not differ significantly, and banks rely on contractual, macroeconomic, bank syndicate structure, and borrowers’ characteristics when pricing sustainable tranches. At the deal-level, our results do not support the hypothesis of sustainable debt financing as a mechanism for reducing firms’ funding costs. We also find that economies of scale, institutional, and information asymmetry arguments affect firms’ choice between sustainable and conventional syndicated deals.