Browsing by Author "Schliephake, Eva"
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- Bank risk-taking and impaired monetary policy transmissionPublication . Koenig, Philipp; Schliephake, EvaWe consider a standard banking model with agency frictions to simultaneously study the weakening and reversal of monetary transmission and banks’ risk-taking in a low-interest environment. Both, weaker monetary transmission and higher risk-taking arise because lower policy rates impair banks’ net worth.The pass-through to deposit rates, the level of excess reserves and the extent of the agency problem between banks and depositors are crucial determinants of monetary transmission. If the deposit pass-through is sufficiently impaired, a reversal rate exists. For policy rates below the reversal rate further interest rate reductions lead to a disproportionate increase in risk-taking and a contraction in loan supply.
- Learning in bank runsPublication . Schliephake, Eva; Shapiro, JoelWe examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.
- Market-triggered contingent capital with incomplete informationPublication . Berg, Tobias; Schliephake, EvaWe analyze the equilibria of market-triggered contingent capital if a bank’s asset value is not common knowledge. Using a global game setup with private signals, we characterize the unique equilibrium for the conversion of the market-triggered contingent capital. The conversion likelihood increases with higher bank leverage, a higher face value of contingent capital, and a greater dilution for incumbent shareholders. We further show that the existence of both a private and a public signal constrains the optimal design of contingent capital for which a unique equilibrium exists.
- Responsible investment and responsible consumptionPublication . Hakenes, Hendrik; Schliephake, EvaTo maximize their impact, socially responsible households can invest responsibly (SRI), consume responsibly (SRC), or do both. The key question of this paper is, which mix of SRI and SRC leads to a desired impact with the lowest loss of utility for responsible households. In a closed micro-economic model, we show that both strategies yield a symmetric impact, proportional to the responsible behavior. For the individual household, however, one strategy dominates the other depending on a condition on risk and product parameters. If responsible households can coordinate on socially responsible action, the welfare maximizing action is to completely abstain from consuming and investing in brown production if the negative externality is high. The coordination on "abstaining" becomes more likely the more households are responsible.