| Nome: | Descrição: | Tamanho: | Formato: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.63 MB | Adobe PDF |
Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
We examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Information-based bank runs