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Learning in bank runs

dc.contributor.authorSchliephake, Eva
dc.contributor.authorShapiro, Joel
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-22T08:05:16Z
dc.date.available2024-10-22T08:05:16Z
dc.date.issued2021-09-26
dc.description.abstractWe examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/47027
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.publisherCentre for Economic Policy Researchpt_PT
dc.subjectInformation-based bank runspt_PT
dc.titleLearning in bank runspt_PT
dc.typeworking paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlaceUnited Kingdompt_PT
oaire.citation.titleCEPR Discussion Paperpt_PT
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typeworkingPaperpt_PT

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