Publication
Learning in bank runs
| dc.contributor.author | Schliephake, Eva | |
| dc.contributor.author | Shapiro, Joel | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-22T08:05:16Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-10-22T08:05:16Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-09-26 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus. | pt_PT |
| dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/47027 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.publisher | Centre for Economic Policy Research | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Information-based bank runs | pt_PT |
| dc.title | Learning in bank runs | pt_PT |
| dc.type | working paper | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| oaire.citation.conferencePlace | United Kingdom | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.title | CEPR Discussion Paper | pt_PT |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | workingPaper | pt_PT |