Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/3486
Título: Sustaining collusion in growing markets
Autor: Vasconcelos, Hélder
Data: 2008
Editora: Wiley Blackwell
Citação: VASCONCELOS, Hélder - Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. ISSN 1530-9134. Vol. 17, n.º 4 (2008), p. 973–1010
Resumo: The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/3486
Versão do Editor: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jems.2008.17.issue-4/issuetoc
Aparece nas colecções:FEG - Artigos em revistas internacionais com Arbitragem / Papers in international journals with Peer-review

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