| Name: | Description: | Size: | Format: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 690.76 KB | Adobe PDF |
Authors
Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Este trabalho tem por objetivo responder à seguinte questão: como enquadrar juridicamente o comportamento de alguém que determina dolosamente outrem à prática de um crime de homicídio, quando este último não chega a praticar qualquer ato de execução – o chamado “pacto para matar”?
Assumimos a teoria do domínio do facto como a que melhor clarifica o quadro legal do artigo 26º e, consequentemente, as duas modalidades de autoria que aqui se confrontam – autoria mediata e instigação –, que têm sido as duas formas de autoria utilizadas pela doutrina e jurisprudência para enquadrar estes casos. Estudámos os dois conceitos a propósito da discórdia suscitada pelo acórdão uniformizador de jurisprudência de 18/06/2009.
Paralelamente, desenvolveu-se uma categoria específica de autoria mediata, denominada de aliciamento por Conceição Valdágua, de forma a deslocar a questão para o âmbito da responsabilidade singular, tratando-se de uma forma de instrumentalização do aliciado, que se subordina voluntariamente à vontade do autor mediato. Sob o nosso ponto de vista, trata-se de um alargamento demasiado rebuscado e contra legem, que não deve merecer acolhimento, pois o homem da frente é uma pessoa plenamente responsável. Fala-se, assim, à luz do princípio da autorresponsabilidade de uma instigação que não se efetivou.
Também importa abordar a matéria da tentativa, onde o legislador exige a execução ou o início dela por parte do executor, motivo pela qual, segundo a lei vigente, o agente não poderá ser punido nestes casos; estamos perante meros atos preparatórios, não puníveis nos termos do artigo 21º.
Não obstante, a punição desses comportamentos não deve, dada a sua perigosidade, ficar dependente da consumação ou não do crime de homicídio: o agente detém o domínio do facto sob a forma de domínio de decisão, é quem impulsiona a decisão de cometer o ilícito, dá todas as indicações ao pretenso executor, é o mandante do crime, que só não se consuma por razões alheias à sua vontade. Assim, mesmo não estando na esfera dos atos de execução, são atos preparatórios que devem ser excecionalmente punidos, por significarem já um perigo para o bem jurídico. Bem sabemos que a intervenção penal deve ser de ultima ratio e apenas na medida em que se considere digna e necessária, mas no nosso entender vislumbram-se estas exigências nestes casos, pelo que se sugere a criminalização da “Proposta de Homicídio”.
This work has, as an objective, answer the following question: how do we frame, juridically, the beaviour of someone who, culpably, sets another one to practice the crime of homicide, when this last one never practices any action: the pact to kill? We take that the control theory is the one that clarifies the meaning of the 26th article and, consequentially, the two types of authorship -indirect authorship and instigation- that have been used by the legal doctrine and jurisprudence to frame these situations. Both of these legal concepts were studied because of the discord arisen by a court decision from 18/06/2009. A specific category of indirect authorship was developed by Conceição Valdágua, denominated by inducement, as a way to move the issue to the field of singular criminal responsibility, because it is an instrumentalization of the inductee, who voluntarily submits to the will of the indirect author. In our perspective this widening of the concept is farfetched and contra legem, and thus should not be accepted, due to the fact that the font man is fully responsible. According to the self-responsibility principle were faced with an instigation that did not culminated in the practice of the crime. Also, we will study the criminal attempt, a field where the legislator demands the execution or its beginning, by the executor, reason why the perpetrator cannot be punished. These are the, non-punishable, preliminary acts, according to the 21th article. Nevertheless, the penalty for these behaviors should not, due to its hazardousness, be dependent of the consummation of the homicide: the perpetrator retains the dominion of the situation, he is the one who propels the decision to commit the crime, he is the one who gives the alleged perpetrator all the needed instructions, he is the one behind the crime, which does not consummate by external causes to his will. Even though they are not in the field of execution acts, they are preliminary acts that should be, exceptionally, punished owing to the fact that they represent an danger to the legal good. We know that the criminal intervention should be the last resort and in the needed measurement. In our understanding, the requirements for these cases are fulfilled, therefore we suggest the criminalization of the “Homicide Proposal”.
This work has, as an objective, answer the following question: how do we frame, juridically, the beaviour of someone who, culpably, sets another one to practice the crime of homicide, when this last one never practices any action: the pact to kill? We take that the control theory is the one that clarifies the meaning of the 26th article and, consequentially, the two types of authorship -indirect authorship and instigation- that have been used by the legal doctrine and jurisprudence to frame these situations. Both of these legal concepts were studied because of the discord arisen by a court decision from 18/06/2009. A specific category of indirect authorship was developed by Conceição Valdágua, denominated by inducement, as a way to move the issue to the field of singular criminal responsibility, because it is an instrumentalization of the inductee, who voluntarily submits to the will of the indirect author. In our perspective this widening of the concept is farfetched and contra legem, and thus should not be accepted, due to the fact that the font man is fully responsible. According to the self-responsibility principle were faced with an instigation that did not culminated in the practice of the crime. Also, we will study the criminal attempt, a field where the legislator demands the execution or its beginning, by the executor, reason why the perpetrator cannot be punished. These are the, non-punishable, preliminary acts, according to the 21th article. Nevertheless, the penalty for these behaviors should not, due to its hazardousness, be dependent of the consummation of the homicide: the perpetrator retains the dominion of the situation, he is the one who propels the decision to commit the crime, he is the one who gives the alleged perpetrator all the needed instructions, he is the one behind the crime, which does not consummate by external causes to his will. Even though they are not in the field of execution acts, they are preliminary acts that should be, exceptionally, punished owing to the fact that they represent an danger to the legal good. We know that the criminal intervention should be the last resort and in the needed measurement. In our understanding, the requirements for these cases are fulfilled, therefore we suggest the criminalization of the “Homicide Proposal”.
Description
Keywords
Comparticipação Autoria mediata Instigação Tentativa Proposta de homicídio Co-participation Indirect authorship Instigation Crime attempt Homicide proposal