Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/18792
Título: The influence of executive compensation on innovation
Autor: Werner, Thiemo
Orientador: Cerqueiro, Geraldo
Novotny-Farkas, Zoltan
Data de Defesa: 4-Nov-2015
Resumo: This dissertation examines the relationship between CEO compensation components and the innovation capabilities of publicly traded companies in the United States of America. Based on an extensive literature review, I hypothesize that payment components with convex payoffs as well as those with long-term payoffs have a positive influence on innovation. Further, I expect cash based compensations to have no or a negative influence on innovation. Lastly, I develop a hypothesis regarding instruments that protect executives in case of failure and their positive influence on innovation. Using a sample of S&P 1500 constituents over 14 years, I find that an increase of the proportion of stock options in CEO compensation has a positive influence on innovation input and output as well as on innovation effectiveness. I obtain similar results for the proportion of long term incentives in the total compensation. For salary and bonus, I find that a higher proportion has a negative influence on innovation input and output. After a sample split, I show that all findings related to compensation components only hold for firms in less innovative industries. In a subsequent small sample analysis, I characterize elements of golden parachute agreements and classify them in accordance to the protection they offer to CEOs. Subsequently, I find evidence that more innovative firms use more and further developed agreements. I conclude that such protections for failure can influence the motivation of executives to innovate.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/18792
Aparece nas colecções:FCEE - Dissertações de Mestrado / Master Dissertations
R - Dissertações de Mestrado / Master Dissertations

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