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O défice tarifário e a possibilidade de haver rendas excessivas têm sido a principal fonte de polémica sobre a intervenção do Estado no setor elétrico nos últimos 25 anos e foram objeto de uma Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito, cujo Relatório, assim como as declarações de voto dos partidos, são uma fonte de informação bem sistematizada sobre o que se passou. Neste trabalho, discutem‑se os fundamentos e as consequências da política de défices tarifários e de políticas que conduziram ao que tem sido considerado como rendas excessivas. Sobre a política de défices tarifários não se encontram fundamentos nem de eficiência, nem de equidade e é duvidoso que se possa justificar com base num argumento de estabilidade tarifária, que foi o argumento mais utilizado formalmente. A criação de rendas excessivas tem no mercado de eletricidade os efeitos negativos associados ao poder de mercado. Numa perspetiva de equilíbrio geral, é possível fundamentar uma política de rendas excessivas com base em critérios de eficiência, mas não foi esta a abordagem seguida pelos governos portugueses que poderá ter estado mais centrada na obtenção de vantagens eleitorais com aquela política. Em sentido diferente, pode-se considerar que em 1995 foi adotado um modelo de regulação contratual que pode gerar a criação de rendas, sem que estas devam ser consideradas como excessivas. Concluindo, qualquer que seja a interpretação dada ao trabalho da Comissão, a sua principal utilidade parece ser a de evidenciar formas de melhorar o processo de decisão pública.
A tariff deficit and excessive rents have been the source of public discussion on energy policy in the last 25 years, and the subject of a recent inquiry by a Parliamentary Commission. The Commission concluded there were excessive rents created by policy options. The rationale for these rents, from the point of view of the policy makers, was that they would increase privatisation revenues and support industrial and environmental policies. The rationale for the tariff deficit was that it would increase price stability. In this paper the Commission’s view that there were excessive rents is initially accepted, and these explanations are discussed from the perspective of public interest and of public choice and economic theories of regulation. It is argued that the best explanation for these policies is not based on the public interest, but on vote seeking behaviour by the governments. It is also suggested that excessive rents in the energy sector might have been sustained on the grounds of public interest, based on efficiency, if complemented by credible commitments to reduce income taxes. However, some doubts remain about the relevant concept of excessive rents. The Commission’s report is ambiguous on these. Moreover, the contractual regulation arrangements adopted by Portuguese public decision‑makers in the energy sector, since the mid‑1990s, may well be the source of informational rents that should not be considered as excessive. In any case, it is argued that the Commission’s report suggests, even if implicitly, to improve public decision‑making, in the energy sector and in state intervention in general.
A tariff deficit and excessive rents have been the source of public discussion on energy policy in the last 25 years, and the subject of a recent inquiry by a Parliamentary Commission. The Commission concluded there were excessive rents created by policy options. The rationale for these rents, from the point of view of the policy makers, was that they would increase privatisation revenues and support industrial and environmental policies. The rationale for the tariff deficit was that it would increase price stability. In this paper the Commission’s view that there were excessive rents is initially accepted, and these explanations are discussed from the perspective of public interest and of public choice and economic theories of regulation. It is argued that the best explanation for these policies is not based on the public interest, but on vote seeking behaviour by the governments. It is also suggested that excessive rents in the energy sector might have been sustained on the grounds of public interest, based on efficiency, if complemented by credible commitments to reduce income taxes. However, some doubts remain about the relevant concept of excessive rents. The Commission’s report is ambiguous on these. Moreover, the contractual regulation arrangements adopted by Portuguese public decision‑makers in the energy sector, since the mid‑1990s, may well be the source of informational rents that should not be considered as excessive. In any case, it is argued that the Commission’s report suggests, even if implicitly, to improve public decision‑making, in the energy sector and in state intervention in general.
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Privatizações Preços de eletricidade Rendas Excedente do consumidor Privatisation Electricity prices Rents Consumer surplus