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Abstract(s)
Ao longo dos anos o Reino Unido (RU) acumulou privilégios e exceções, obstruindo permanente-mente o processo de integração europeia. Em 29 de março de 2017 invocou o artigo 50 para a saída da União Europeia (UE), decisão democrática que envolveu um referendo, confirmado várias vezes no Parlamento por maiorias esmagadoras e pelo resultado das eleições gerais de junho de 2017. Trata-se de um desenvolvimento positivo e neces-sário, visto que a União tem de salvaguardar a sua integridade e avançar com o projeto de integração europeia. Por outro lado, a UE também não pode permitir que ex-membros obtenham concessões ou privilégios que estão reservados aos membros da UE (que têm obrigações) e que iriam minar o nor-mal funcionamento da União e o projeto político de integração. Por isso, a UE não pode ceder a tentati-vas de abuso dos benefícios do clube através do tipo de “Brexit” (eufemisticamente denominado “soft Brexit”, acordos à medida ou de transição e similares) que alguns no RU parecem reclamar
The UK over time became an outlier in the EU, with many privileges and opt-outs, permanently obstructing European integration. It ended up triggering Article 50, as the outcome of a democratic process that involved a referendum, confirmed in parliament by overwhelming majorities and by the outcome of a general election. We argue that this is a positive and necessary development for the EU to be sustainable, as the Union has to protect its integrity and advance with the European integration project. On the other hand, the EU can also not allow that post-Brexit outsiders have special deals or conces-sions with privileges that only accrue from membership, as that would undermine its functioning and the Euro-pean political integration project. It follows that the EU cannot give in to any free riding on the EU club benefits through the kind of Brexit (euphemistically called soft Brexit, bespoke deal, transitional deal and the like) that some in the UK seem to demand.
The UK over time became an outlier in the EU, with many privileges and opt-outs, permanently obstructing European integration. It ended up triggering Article 50, as the outcome of a democratic process that involved a referendum, confirmed in parliament by overwhelming majorities and by the outcome of a general election. We argue that this is a positive and necessary development for the EU to be sustainable, as the Union has to protect its integrity and advance with the European integration project. On the other hand, the EU can also not allow that post-Brexit outsiders have special deals or conces-sions with privileges that only accrue from membership, as that would undermine its functioning and the Euro-pean political integration project. It follows that the EU cannot give in to any free riding on the EU club benefits through the kind of Brexit (euphemistically called soft Brexit, bespoke deal, transitional deal and the like) that some in the UK seem to demand.