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Dual-class shares e o impacto no corporate governance : caso Farfetch
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A presente dissertação analisa o impacto das estruturas de dual-class shares na governação societária, com enfoque no caso da Farfetch. Através da dissociação entre controlo e interesse económico, estas estruturas permitem a concentração de poder nas mãos dos fundadores, com implicações relevantes ao nível da transparência, da fiscalização e da proteção dos acionistas minoritários. É discutido o princípio One Share, One Vote e a sua consagração no ordenamento jurídico português, confrontando-o com a crescente adoção de modelos DCS em mercados internacionais. A análise teórica é complementada por evidência empírica e culmina numa avaliação crítica da estrutura acionista da Farfetch, destacando os riscos associados à ausência de mecanismos de equilíbrio e à perpetuação do controlo.
This dissertation examines the impact of dual-class share structures on corporate governance, with a particular focus on the case of Farfetch. By separating control from economic interest, these structures allow founders to retain concentrated decision-making power, raising significant concerns regarding transparency, oversight, and the protection of minority shareholders. The analysis explores the One Share, One Vote principle and its implementation under portuguese company law, contrasting it with the growing adoption of DCS models in international capital markets. The theoretical framework is supported by empirical evidence and culminates in a critical evaluation of Farfetch’s shareholder structure, highlighting the risks associated with the absence of internal checks and the perpetuation of founder control.
This dissertation examines the impact of dual-class share structures on corporate governance, with a particular focus on the case of Farfetch. By separating control from economic interest, these structures allow founders to retain concentrated decision-making power, raising significant concerns regarding transparency, oversight, and the protection of minority shareholders. The analysis explores the One Share, One Vote principle and its implementation under portuguese company law, contrasting it with the growing adoption of DCS models in international capital markets. The theoretical framework is supported by empirical evidence and culminates in a critical evaluation of Farfetch’s shareholder structure, highlighting the risks associated with the absence of internal checks and the perpetuation of founder control.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Voto plural Dual-class shares Farfetch Problemas de agência Estrutura acionista Corporate governance One share One vote Sunset clauses Agency problems Shareholding structure
Contexto Educativo
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Licença CC
Sem licença CC