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On-site inspecting zombie lending

dc.contributor.authorBonfim, Diana
dc.contributor.authorCerqueiro, Geraldo
dc.contributor.authorDegryse, Hans
dc.contributor.authorOngena, Steven
dc.date.accessioned2023-04-26T08:18:01Z
dc.date.available2023-04-26T08:18:01Z
dc.date.issued2022-06-07
dc.description.abstract“Zombie lending” remains a widespread practice by banks around the world. In this paper, we exploit a series of large-scale on-site inspections made on the credit portfolios of several Portuguese banks to investigate how these inspections affect banks’ future lending decisions. We find that an inspected bank becomes 20% less likely to refinance zombie firms, immediately spurring their default. Overall, banks seemingly reduce zombie lending because the incentives to hold these loans disappear once they are forced to recognize losses.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.2022.4452pt_PT
dc.identifier.eid85161316282
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/40951
dc.identifier.wos000827227000001
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.titleOn-site inspecting zombie lendingpt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.titleManagement Sciencept_PT
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT

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