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Além dos tratados : a fiscalidade internacional sem acordos de dupla tributação
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A presente dissertação analisa criticamente o papel dos Acordos de Dupla Tributação no contexto da tributação internacional contemporânea, questionando a sua indispensabilidade na prossecução dos principais objetivos da cooperação tributária entre Estados. A investigação parte do pressuposto de que, embora historicamente considerados instrumentos centrais na eliminação da dupla tributação jurídica internacional e na prevenção da evasão fiscal, os Acordos de Dupla Tributação não constituem mecanismos exclusivos ou absolutamente necessários para alcançar esses fins. Através de uma análise crítica e sistematizada, demonstrou-se que existem alternativas viáveis, de natureza unilateral e multilateral, que permitem assegurar a eliminação da dupla tributação, prevenir o planeamento fiscal agressivo, garantir a não discriminação fiscal, facilitar a troca de informações entre administrações tributárias e resolver litígios fiscais transfronteiriços. Neste contexto, são analisadas soluções unilaterais, como os métodos do crédito ou da isenção, as regras CFC, as cláusulas gerais anti abuso, e multilaterais, como as diretivas da União Europeia (nomeadamente, a ATAD, a DAC e a Diretiva 2017/1852), os instrumentos da OCDE, bem como práticas administrativas e jurisdicionais internas com eficácia transfronteiriça. A dissertação dedica especial atenção à conjetura dos países em desenvolvimento, demonstrando como a estrutura convencional dos Acordos de Dupla Tributação, baseada no Modelo da OCDE, favorece desproporcionalmente os Estados exportadores de capital e limita a capacidade de tributação na fonte, com implicações diretas na perda de receitas fiscais. São também abordados casos paradigmáticos, como a denúncia unilateral do Acordo de Dupla Tributação entre a Alemanha e o Brasil e a ausência de convenções entre os Estados Unidos e os países da África Subsariana. Assim, conclui-se que os Acordos de Dupla Tributação devem ser vistos como ferramentas contingentes, cuja celebração deve ser ponderada com base numa análise de custo-benefício, tendo em conta as características económicas e fiscais dos países contratantes, e não como pressupostos incontornáveis de uma ordem fiscal global justa.
This dissertation critically examines the role of Double Taxation Agreements within the framework of contemporary international taxation, questioning their indispensability in achieving the primary objectives of inter-State tax cooperation. The research proceeds on the assumption that, although historically regarded as central instruments for eliminating international juridical double taxation and preventing tax evasion, Double Taxation Agreements are neither exclusive nor absolutely necessary mechanisms for attaining those purposes. Through a critical and systematic analysis, it is demonstrated that viable alternatives – of unilateral and multilateral nature – exist and are capable of ensuring the elimination of double taxation, preventing aggressive tax planning, safeguarding non-discrimination in taxation, facilitating the exchange of information between tax administrations, and resolving cross-border tax disputes. In this context, the study analyses alternative mechanisms such as the unilateral credit or exemption method, Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) rules, general anti-abuse provisions, relevant European Union directives (notably ATAD, DAC, and Directive (EU) 2017/1852), OECD multilateral instruments, as well as domestic administrative and judicial practices with cross-border relevance. The dissertation devotes particular attention to the situation of developing countries, demonstrating how the conventional structure of Double Taxation Agreements – based on the OECD Model Convention – disproportionately benefits capital-exporting States and restricts source taxation rights, with direct consequences for revenue losses in developing jurisdictions. Paradigmatic examples are also examined, such as the unilateral termination of the Double Taxation Agreement between Germany and Brazil, and the absence of any tax treaties between the United States and Sub-Saharan African countries. Accordingly, it is concluded that Double Taxation Agreements should be regarded as contingent tools, which must be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis through a cost benefit analysis that considers the economic and fiscal profiles of the contracting States, rather than being assumed as an unavoidable prerequisite for a fair global tax order.
This dissertation critically examines the role of Double Taxation Agreements within the framework of contemporary international taxation, questioning their indispensability in achieving the primary objectives of inter-State tax cooperation. The research proceeds on the assumption that, although historically regarded as central instruments for eliminating international juridical double taxation and preventing tax evasion, Double Taxation Agreements are neither exclusive nor absolutely necessary mechanisms for attaining those purposes. Through a critical and systematic analysis, it is demonstrated that viable alternatives – of unilateral and multilateral nature – exist and are capable of ensuring the elimination of double taxation, preventing aggressive tax planning, safeguarding non-discrimination in taxation, facilitating the exchange of information between tax administrations, and resolving cross-border tax disputes. In this context, the study analyses alternative mechanisms such as the unilateral credit or exemption method, Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) rules, general anti-abuse provisions, relevant European Union directives (notably ATAD, DAC, and Directive (EU) 2017/1852), OECD multilateral instruments, as well as domestic administrative and judicial practices with cross-border relevance. The dissertation devotes particular attention to the situation of developing countries, demonstrating how the conventional structure of Double Taxation Agreements – based on the OECD Model Convention – disproportionately benefits capital-exporting States and restricts source taxation rights, with direct consequences for revenue losses in developing jurisdictions. Paradigmatic examples are also examined, such as the unilateral termination of the Double Taxation Agreement between Germany and Brazil, and the absence of any tax treaties between the United States and Sub-Saharan African countries. Accordingly, it is concluded that Double Taxation Agreements should be regarded as contingent tools, which must be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis through a cost benefit analysis that considers the economic and fiscal profiles of the contracting States, rather than being assumed as an unavoidable prerequisite for a fair global tax order.
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Dupla tributação internacional Acordos de dupla tributação Métodos unilaterais Relação entre ambos Países em desenvolvimento International double taxation Double taxation agreements Unilateral methods Comparative analysis Developing countries
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Licença CC
Sem licença CC