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Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese–English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Japanese-English auctions Wallet game Discrete bids
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Gonçalves, R., Ray, I. (2017). A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels. Economics Letters, 159, 177-179
Editora
Elsevier