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Liquidity risk and collective moral hazard

dc.contributor.authorBonfim, Diana
dc.contributor.authorKim, Moshe
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-31T15:10:04Z
dc.date.available2021-03-31T15:10:04Z
dc.date.issued2019-06
dc.description.abstractBanks individually optimize their liquidity risk manage-ment, often neglecting the externalities generated by their choices on the overall risk of the financial system. However, banks may have incentives to optimize their choices not strictly at the individual level, but engaging instead in collective risk-taking strategies. In this paper we look for evidence of such behaviors in the run-up to the global financial crisis. We find strong and robust evidence of peer effects in banks’ liquidity risk management. This suggests that incentives for collective risk-taking play a role in banks’ choices, thus calling for a macroprudential approach to liquidity regulation.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.eid85071191734
dc.identifier.issn1815-4654
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/32430
dc.identifier.wos000482710000004
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.titleLiquidity risk and collective moral hazardpt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.endPage150pt_PT
oaire.citation.issue2pt_PT
oaire.citation.startPage101pt_PT
oaire.citation.volume15pt_PT
person.familyNameBonfim
person.givenNameDiana
person.identifier.ciencia-id1116-0733-DDF9
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-3108-8514
person.identifier.scopus-author-id25225177100
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT
relation.isAuthorOfPublication9708558a-3b73-4eeb-b8f3-9b4d2b6dee47
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery9708558a-3b73-4eeb-b8f3-9b4d2b6dee47

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