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Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
This paper explores the effects of a particular form of irrational behaviour by participating bidders in a common value English
auction.We allow bidders to update their expected valuation of the good as the current price increases, assuming that their opponents
always play the symmetric Nash equilibrium. When only one bidder adopts this type of behaviour, it is ambiguous whether the
final auction price is higher or lower than at the symmetric equilibrium. However, when both bidders behave irrationally, the final
auction price is never lower than the symmetric equilibrium provided bidders “match” their strategies.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
English auctions Irrationality Asymmetric equilibrium
Contexto Educativo
Citação
GONÇALVES, Ricardo - Irrationality in English auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. ISSN 1467-8586. Vol. 67, N.º 1 (2008), p. 180-192
Editora
John Wiley & Sons