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Abstract(s)
A presente dissertação tem como objetivo avaliar se certas características do conselho de administração das empresas portuguesas cotadas em bolsa têm, ou não, impacto nos níveis de manipulação de resultados das mesmas. Assim sendo, foi averiguado o impacto que a proporção de administradores não executivos e a presença de uma comissão de auditoria no conselho de administração têm nos níveis de manipulação de resultados, bem como, a distinção de funções entre o presidente do conselho de administração (chairman) e o diretor executivo (CEO). Para tal, a metodologia utilizada foi uma regressão linear múltipla para avaliar de que forma a manipulação de resultados está relacionada com as variáveis em estudo. Foi também utilizado o modelo de Jones modificado cross-sectional, sendo o princípio deste modelo determinar a manipulação de resultados através dos accruals discricionários. Os dados necessários foram extraídos da base de dados Refinitiv Eikon, com o complemento dos relatórios financeiros e de governo das sociedades, das empresas analisadas. A amostra é constituída por um agregado de 40 empresas portuguesas cotadas em bolsa, que integravam o PSI Geral entre 2016 e 2020. No que respeita aos resultados alcançados, este trabalho evidencia que, para a amostra em questão, a proporção de administradores não executivos no conselho de administração e a distinção de funções entre o chairman e o CEO não têm impacto nos níveis de manipulação. Por outro lado, foi possível concluir uma relação negativa entre a existência de uma comissão de auditoria integrada no conselho de administração e a prática de manipulação de resultados.
This dissertation aims to assess whether certain characteristics of the board of directors of Portuguese companies listed on the stock exchange have an impact on their levels of earnings manipulation. Therefore, it was investigated the impact that the proportion of non-executive directors and the presence of an audit committee on the board of directors have on the levels of manipulation of results, as well as the distinction of functions between the chairman of the board of directors and the executive director. For this, the methodology used was a multiple linear regression to assess how the manipulation of results is related to the variables under study. The modified cross-sectional Jones model was also used, with the principle of this model determining the manipulation of results through discretionary accruals. The necessary data were extracted from the Refinitiv Eikon database, with the complement of the companies' financial and corporate governance reports. The sample consists of an aggregate of 40 Portuguese companies listed on the stock exchange, which were part of the PSI Geral in the period from 2016 to 2020. Regarding the results achieved, this work shows that, for the sample in question, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors and the distinction of roles between the chairman and the CEO have no impact on the levels of manipulation. On the other hand, it was possible to conclude a negative relationship between the existence of an audit committee integrated in the board of directors and the practice of earnings manipulation.
This dissertation aims to assess whether certain characteristics of the board of directors of Portuguese companies listed on the stock exchange have an impact on their levels of earnings manipulation. Therefore, it was investigated the impact that the proportion of non-executive directors and the presence of an audit committee on the board of directors have on the levels of manipulation of results, as well as the distinction of functions between the chairman of the board of directors and the executive director. For this, the methodology used was a multiple linear regression to assess how the manipulation of results is related to the variables under study. The modified cross-sectional Jones model was also used, with the principle of this model determining the manipulation of results through discretionary accruals. The necessary data were extracted from the Refinitiv Eikon database, with the complement of the companies' financial and corporate governance reports. The sample consists of an aggregate of 40 Portuguese companies listed on the stock exchange, which were part of the PSI Geral in the period from 2016 to 2020. Regarding the results achieved, this work shows that, for the sample in question, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors and the distinction of roles between the chairman and the CEO have no impact on the levels of manipulation. On the other hand, it was possible to conclude a negative relationship between the existence of an audit committee integrated in the board of directors and the practice of earnings manipulation.
Description
Keywords
Manipulação de resultados Accruals discricionários Modelo de Jones modificado Governo das sociedades Conselho de administração Earnings management Discretionary accruals Modified Jones model Corporate governance Board of directors