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A responsabilidade penal dos administradores no âmbito do compliance empresarial : desafios e limites na prevenção de infrações, em especial da corrupção
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A responsabilidade penal dos administradores tem assumido um crescimento significativo no Ordenamento Jurídico Português, tendo subjacente a complexidade das estruturas empresariais e o alargamento da intervenção penal no domínio da criminalidade empresarial. Assim sendo, a intervenção do Direito Penal não se limita à aplicação de sanções punitivas, mas também assume uma função de tutela dos interesses económicos, sociais e institucionais que gravitam em torno da atividade empresarial. A imputação penal individual aos administradores encontra um dos seus pontos centrais na problemática da omissão imprópria e, em particular, na função de garante que é atribuída pelo artigo 64.º do Código das Sociedades Comerciais e acolhida pelo artigo 10.º, n.º 2, do Código Penal, recaindo sobre estes agentes um dever de vigilância e de controlo. Contudo, exigir que o administrador responda por qualquer infração cometida por subordinados ou por falhas estruturais imprevisíveis significaria desvirtuar o princípio da pessoalidade da responsabilidade criminal, transformando o garante num responsável absoluto, em desconformidade com os princípios de imputação subjetiva. Neste contexto, surge uma tensão do sistema: por um lado, a sociedade exige que os administradores não permaneçam impunes quando, pela sua omissão, praticam qualquer crime praticado no âmbito empresarial; e por outro lado, exige-se que a sua responsabilização não se converta numa punição contraditória com os fundamentos dogmáticos do Direito Penal. Deste modo, têm-se desenvolvido diversos instrumentos de autorregulação e de prevenção, nomeadamente o complicance criminal, cujo principal objetivo centra-se em estruturar mecanismos internos capazes de reduzir riscos de infrações e de mitigar a responsabilidade penal dos administradores. A relevância deste estudo reside na procura de uma estrutura equilibrada entre duas exigências: i) assegurar a responsabilidade penal dos administradores pelo incumprimento dos seus deveres de garante, ii) bem como evitar que o Direito Penal se transforme numa instância de punição automática, desvirtuando os princípios que o caracterizam.
The criminal liability of directors has seen significant growth within the Portuguese legal system, reflecting both the increasing complexity of corporate structures and the expansion of criminal law intervention in the field of corporate crime. Accordingly, the intervention of criminal law is not confined to the imposition of punitive sanctions, but also assumes a protective function over the economic, social, and institutional interests surrounding business activity. The individual criminal attribution to directors finds one of its central points in the issue of omission by commission and, in particular, in the guarantor role assigned to them under assigned by Article 64 of the Portuguese Companies Code and incorporated into Article 10(2) of the Portuguese Penal Code. Such a role imposes on these actors a duty of oversight and control diligence. However, to demand that a director be held accountable for any offence committed by subordinates or for unforeseeable structural failures would amount to distorting the principle of personal criminal responsibility, thereby transforming the guarantor into an absolute liable party, in contradiction with the principles of subjective attribution. In this context, a tension arises within the system: on the one hand, society demands that company directors should not remain unpunished when, through omission, they contribute to the commission of crimes within the corporate sphere; on the other hand, it is required that their liability does not turn into a form of punishment that contradicts the dogmatic foundations of Criminal Law. As a result, various instruments of self-regulation and prevention have been developed, most notably criminal compliance mechanisms, whose primary objective is to structure internal mechanisms capable of reducing the risk of infringements and mitigating the criminal liability of directors. The relevance of this study lies in the pursuit of a balanced framework between two imperatives: i) ensuring the criminal liability of directors for breaches of their guarantor duties, while ii) preventing criminal law from becoming a system of automatic punishment, thereby undermining its guiding principles.
The criminal liability of directors has seen significant growth within the Portuguese legal system, reflecting both the increasing complexity of corporate structures and the expansion of criminal law intervention in the field of corporate crime. Accordingly, the intervention of criminal law is not confined to the imposition of punitive sanctions, but also assumes a protective function over the economic, social, and institutional interests surrounding business activity. The individual criminal attribution to directors finds one of its central points in the issue of omission by commission and, in particular, in the guarantor role assigned to them under assigned by Article 64 of the Portuguese Companies Code and incorporated into Article 10(2) of the Portuguese Penal Code. Such a role imposes on these actors a duty of oversight and control diligence. However, to demand that a director be held accountable for any offence committed by subordinates or for unforeseeable structural failures would amount to distorting the principle of personal criminal responsibility, thereby transforming the guarantor into an absolute liable party, in contradiction with the principles of subjective attribution. In this context, a tension arises within the system: on the one hand, society demands that company directors should not remain unpunished when, through omission, they contribute to the commission of crimes within the corporate sphere; on the other hand, it is required that their liability does not turn into a form of punishment that contradicts the dogmatic foundations of Criminal Law. As a result, various instruments of self-regulation and prevention have been developed, most notably criminal compliance mechanisms, whose primary objective is to structure internal mechanisms capable of reducing the risk of infringements and mitigating the criminal liability of directors. The relevance of this study lies in the pursuit of a balanced framework between two imperatives: i) ensuring the criminal liability of directors for breaches of their guarantor duties, while ii) preventing criminal law from becoming a system of automatic punishment, thereby undermining its guiding principles.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Direito penal Responsabilidade penal dos administradores Compliance Corrupção Dever de garante Mitigação da responsabilidade penal Criminal law Criminal liability of directors Corruption Guarantor duty Mitigation of criminal liability
Contexto Educativo
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Licença CC
Sem licença CC