Publication
Executive compensation inside family-controlled firms : is self-motivation enough?
| datacite.subject.fos | Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Cerqueiro, Geraldo | |
| dc.contributor.author | Almeida, Bruno Miguel Matos de | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-10T09:24:43Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-12-10T09:24:43Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-11-04 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this research is to analyse the differences in chief executive officer (CEO) pay-to-performance sensitivity in family and non-family controlled firms. The corporate governance literature argues that CEOs in family businesses have superior incentives with regards to maximizing firm performance and therefore require less compensation-based incentives. In order to validate such assumptions, an analysis was carried out to test whether family CEOs´ total compensation and performance-based incentives are lower than in non-family controlled firms. Employing a fixed effects panel data regression on a sample of 80 firms it is shown that neither total pay nor equity-based compensation seems to be affected by the ownership structure of the firm. Furthermore, the change in the compensation scheme for a firm that replaced a family CEO with a non-family executive was studied. The case study suggests that family controlled firms should increase compensation of non-family related CEOs. | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.tid | 201170159 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/18794 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.title | Executive compensation inside family-controlled firms : is self-motivation enough? | pt_PT |
| dc.type | master thesis | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | masterThesis | pt_PT |
| thesis.degree.name | Mestrado em Finanças |