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Abstract(s)
Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, os Estados Unidos da América (EUA) desenvolveram uma política externa baseada num processo de construção e legitimação hegemónico, consentâneo com a defesa dos princípios da democracia, do liberalismo económico e da paz. No âmbito desta grande estratégia hegemónica (Grand Strategy), e como parte integrante desta acção, foi possível assistir à evolução de uma concepção de política externa distinta, baseada em ideias, conceitos e orientações ideológicas emanadas do neoconservadorismo, em particular a partir da década de 70. A face mais visível deste pensamento surgiu durante a Administração de George W. Bush, após os ataques terroristas de 11 de Setembro de 2001. A derrota Republicana, nas eleições presidenciais de 2008, foi interpretada pelos críticos como uma renúncia às políticas – em particular, ao nível externo – daquela Administração. Consequentemente, assumiu-se que o ciclo do neoconservadorismo chegava ao fim. Curiosamente, a vitória político-ideológica sobre a União Soviética, durante a Administração de Ronald Reagan, foi explicada como sendo um resultado do sucesso do neoconservadorismo no âmbito da política externa. Paradoxalmente, por essa razão, alguns dos fundadores do neoconservadorismo, como Irving Kristol e Norman Podhoretz, vieram também advogar o seu desaparecimento. Ou seja, independentemente do contexto, o neoconservadorismo é constantemente confrontado com dúvidas sobre a importância do seu contributo no que se refere ao processo de decisão político dos EUA, sobretudo, no âmbito da sua agenda externa.
Segundo esta Tese, o neoconservadorismo é uma escola de política externa que assenta num pensamento com uma complexidade histórica e uma importância político-intelectual para a política exterior dos EUA nem sempre reconhecidas. Principalmente, acrescenta um outro entendimento – numa lógica de complementaridade, mas indispensável, – sobre a forma como foi edificada a grande estratégia de hegemonia dos EUA. Ou seja, esta Tese não argumenta que o neoconservadorismo foi apenas a única escola de política externa com um contributo relevante para a actual construção hegemónica dos EUA, nem que está sempre no centro do processo decisório. Argumenta-se, isso sim, que esta escola de pensamento desempenhou um papel próprio em alguns dos mais importantes momentos da História política dos EUA e que deve ser levada em linha de conta por qualquer decisor político racional ou analista. Esta relevância é sobretudo visível no período de tempo que delimita a criação da Coligação para Uma Maioria Democrata (Coalition for a Democratic Majority – CDM), em 1972 – porque consideramos que marca o princípio de uma identidade própria do neoconservadorismo em termos de política externa –, e as duas Administrações de George W. Bush (2001-2009), expoente máximo daquilo que foi a projecção política dos princípios do neoconservadorismo. Por isso, ao contrário dos argumentos que advogam o seu fim e que apelam, directamente ou indirectamente, à sua “momentaneidade”, considera-se que o neoconservadorismo não está “morto”. Pelo contrário, tem um largo futuro pela frente devendo ser tido em conta na análise da projecção da hegemonia norte- americana, tanto no último quartel do século XX, como é, claro, no século XXI, que agora se inicia.
After World War II the United States of America (USA) developed a foreign policy based on a process of hegemonic legitimisation established mainly on the principles of democracy, free-markets and peace. Within this hegemonic grand strategy process it was possible to observe the evolution of a distinct approach to foreign policy, based on ideas, conceptions and ideological orientations originating from a specific branch of American conservatism: neoconservatism. The neoconservative movement emerged in the early 1970s, and was prominent in the George W. Bush Administration after 9/11. Following the Republican defeat in the 2008 Presidential and Congressional elections, some of the critics interpreted this outcome as a rejection of Bush’s political agenda, in particular of his foreign policy strategy. More important at the core of their argument was the notion that the cycle of neoconservatism was over. Interestingly enough, the political-ideological win over the Soviet Union, during Ronald Reagan’s Administration, was explained as a result of the success of neoconservatism in US foreign policy. At the time, paradoxically, the founders of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, emphatically declared that neoconservatism was “dead” as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. In other words, regardless of the context, neoconservatism is constantly confronted with doubts about the importance of its contribution, specifically in what concerns the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process. According to this PhD thesis, neoconservatism is a school of foreign policy that is based on intellectual values with a complex history and an intellectual-political importance for U.S. foreign policy that isn’t always recognized. Above all, it adds a particular understanding – in some extent complementary, but indispensable, – about how the U.S. grand hegemonic strategy was built. That is to say, this thesis doesn’t argue that neoconservatism was the only school of thought with an important contribution to the US grand strategy of hegemony, nor will it assume that neoconservatism is always at the core of the decision making process. However, this thesis does argue that this school of thought played an important role in certain periods of American political history and should be recognized by any rational decision maker or analyst. This relevance is especially visible in the period of time between the establishment of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) in 1972 - that pinpoints the beginning of a specific identity of neoconservatism in foreign policy - and the two administrations of George W. Bush (2001-2009), in great measure responsible for the political projection of the neoconservatism principles. Therefore, unlike the arguments that advocate its end and that appeal, directly or indirectly, to its "momentariness", it is considered that neoconservatism is not "dead". Rather, it has a long future ahead and should be taken into account when analyzing the projection of American hegemony, both in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as is, of course, in the twenty-first century, which is now beginning.
After World War II the United States of America (USA) developed a foreign policy based on a process of hegemonic legitimisation established mainly on the principles of democracy, free-markets and peace. Within this hegemonic grand strategy process it was possible to observe the evolution of a distinct approach to foreign policy, based on ideas, conceptions and ideological orientations originating from a specific branch of American conservatism: neoconservatism. The neoconservative movement emerged in the early 1970s, and was prominent in the George W. Bush Administration after 9/11. Following the Republican defeat in the 2008 Presidential and Congressional elections, some of the critics interpreted this outcome as a rejection of Bush’s political agenda, in particular of his foreign policy strategy. More important at the core of their argument was the notion that the cycle of neoconservatism was over. Interestingly enough, the political-ideological win over the Soviet Union, during Ronald Reagan’s Administration, was explained as a result of the success of neoconservatism in US foreign policy. At the time, paradoxically, the founders of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, emphatically declared that neoconservatism was “dead” as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. In other words, regardless of the context, neoconservatism is constantly confronted with doubts about the importance of its contribution, specifically in what concerns the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process. According to this PhD thesis, neoconservatism is a school of foreign policy that is based on intellectual values with a complex history and an intellectual-political importance for U.S. foreign policy that isn’t always recognized. Above all, it adds a particular understanding – in some extent complementary, but indispensable, – about how the U.S. grand hegemonic strategy was built. That is to say, this thesis doesn’t argue that neoconservatism was the only school of thought with an important contribution to the US grand strategy of hegemony, nor will it assume that neoconservatism is always at the core of the decision making process. However, this thesis does argue that this school of thought played an important role in certain periods of American political history and should be recognized by any rational decision maker or analyst. This relevance is especially visible in the period of time between the establishment of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) in 1972 - that pinpoints the beginning of a specific identity of neoconservatism in foreign policy - and the two administrations of George W. Bush (2001-2009), in great measure responsible for the political projection of the neoconservatism principles. Therefore, unlike the arguments that advocate its end and that appeal, directly or indirectly, to its "momentariness", it is considered that neoconservatism is not "dead". Rather, it has a long future ahead and should be taken into account when analyzing the projection of American hegemony, both in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as is, of course, in the twenty-first century, which is now beginning.