Publication
Collusion between two-sided platforms
| dc.contributor.author | Lefouili, Yassine | |
| dc.contributor.author | Pinho, Joana | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-10-02T18:02:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-10-02T18:02:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-09 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions. | pt_PT |
| dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656 | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.eid | 85089488930 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0167-7187 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42736 | |
| dc.identifier.wos | 000573442600006 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.peerreviewed | yes | pt_PT |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Collusion | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Cross-group externalities | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Two-sided markets | pt_PT |
| dc.title | Collusion between two-sided platforms | pt_PT |
| dc.type | journal article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| oaire.citation.title | International Journal of Industrial Organization | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.volume | 72 | pt_PT |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | article | pt_PT |