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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
A presente dissertação centra-se à volta da Teoria da Agência enquanto racional
económico explicativo do surgimento de conflitos de interesses na relação entre
acionistas e administradores. Tentamos demonstrar a importância da remuneração dos
últimos, como mecanismo apto para mitigar os problemas de agência, dando especial
enfâse à componente variável da remuneração enquanto mecanismo de alinhamento de
interesses e, bem assim, de melhoria de performance da sociedade, a curto, médio e longo
prazo.
Adicionalmente, iremos indagar sobre os órgãos competentes para fixar a política
remuneratória dos administradores, enfatizando a Comissão de Remunerações como
órgão bem munido para desempenhar estas funções face a outras alternativas, analisando
as práticas de 5 sociedades portuguesas nesta sede.
Refletiremos sobre a estrutura remuneratória em si, na qual iremos abordar os
critérios utlizados para determinar a componente variável da remuneração face aos riscos
que apresenta, destacando a importância de critérios objetivos e pré-definidos que
orientem a atuação do administrador. Por fim, sublinharemos os limites legais e
recomendatórios à autonomia privada a nível da estrutura remuneratória, comentando-os,
culminando numa análise das estruturas remuneratórias adotadas na prática societária
portuguesa, procurando aferir se estas adotam boas práticas de governo.
This dissertation is centered around the Agency Theory as an economic rationale explaining the emergence of conflicts of interest in the relation between shareholders and executive board members. We try to demonstrate the importance of the remuneration of the latter, as a mechanism able to mitigate agency problems, giving special emphasis to the variable component of the remuneration as a mechanism of alignment of interests and, as well as, of improvement of the performance of the company, in the short and long term. In addition, we will study the competent bodies to set the remuneration policy for executives, emphasizing the Remuneration Committee as the body best equipped to perform these functions in comparison to other alternatives, analysing the practices of 5 Portuguese companies in this area. We will also reflect on the remuneration structure itself, in which we will address the criteria used to determine the variable component of the remuneration in view of the risks it presents, highlighting the importance of objective and pre-defined criteria that guide the executives’ actions. Finally, we will underline the legal and recommendatory limits to private autonomy in terms of remuneration structure, commenting on them, culminating in an analysis of the remuneration structures adopted in Portuguese corporate practice, seeking to assess whether they adopt good governance practices.
This dissertation is centered around the Agency Theory as an economic rationale explaining the emergence of conflicts of interest in the relation between shareholders and executive board members. We try to demonstrate the importance of the remuneration of the latter, as a mechanism able to mitigate agency problems, giving special emphasis to the variable component of the remuneration as a mechanism of alignment of interests and, as well as, of improvement of the performance of the company, in the short and long term. In addition, we will study the competent bodies to set the remuneration policy for executives, emphasizing the Remuneration Committee as the body best equipped to perform these functions in comparison to other alternatives, analysing the practices of 5 Portuguese companies in this area. We will also reflect on the remuneration structure itself, in which we will address the criteria used to determine the variable component of the remuneration in view of the risks it presents, highlighting the importance of objective and pre-defined criteria that guide the executives’ actions. Finally, we will underline the legal and recommendatory limits to private autonomy in terms of remuneration structure, commenting on them, culminating in an analysis of the remuneration structures adopted in Portuguese corporate practice, seeking to assess whether they adopt good governance practices.
Description
Keywords
Remuneração de administradores Acionistas Conflitos de interesses Teoria da agência Remuneração variável Comissão de remunerações Say on pay Pay for performance Estrutura remuneratória Critérios de desempenho Práticas remuneratórias Executive compensation Shareholders Conflict of interests Agency theory Variable compensation Remunerations committee Compensation structure KPI Practices