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O Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, e pelos Acórdãos Uniformizadores de Jurisprudência nºs 4/14 e 4/19 proferidos em sede de processo de insolvência, tem efetuado uma interpretação restritiva da alínea f) do n.º 1 do art. 755º do CC, considerando que aquele direito de garantia, e até em face da prevalência face à hipoteca (ainda que anteriormente registada) apenas se aplica ao promitente beneficiário da promessa que é consumidor e nos casos em que o imóvel, objeto da traditio, se destina à habitação ou a uso particular. Logo, no âmbito dos processos de insolvência do promitente-alienante, entende o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça que nas promessas obrigacionais e com traditio, em que o imóvel se destina à habitação, o beneficiário consumidor da dita promessa, e desde que verificados os respetivos pressupostos, tem o seu crédito garantido pelo direito de retenção, prevalecendo este sobre a hipoteca. A verdade é que não parece legalmente admissível uma interpretação restritiva, da alínea f) do n.º 1 do art.755 do CC, pois não tem respaldo na lei. E o direito de retenção ali previsto não será de aplicar ao processo insolvencial, porquanto este contempla um regime imperativo que não prevê a aplicação daquele preceito e consequentemente da atribuição de tal direito de garantia. Logo, o crédito do dito beneficiário da promessa será classificado como comum e já não como crédito garantido. A diferenciação de regimes tem levado o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça a corrigir interpretativamente a lei, ainda que contra legem. Entende-se que somente uma alteração legislativa ao art. 106º do Código de Insolvência que venha a conceder ao beneficiário da promessa, ainda que com eficácia meramente obrigacional e em que tenha acontecido a traditio, o direito de retenção previsto na alínea f) do n.º 1 do art. 755º do CC, sem que se admita a interpretação restritiva, permitirá a adequada proteção legal deste beneficiário.
The Supreme Court of Justice through Rulings 4/14 and 4/19 Standardising Jurisprudence handed down in insolvency proceedings, has produced a restrictive interpretation of paragraph f) of no. 1 of article 755 of the Civil Code, considering that right of guarantee, even when faced with the prevalence accorded to the mortgage (if previously registered) only applies to the beneficiary of the intended sale in those cases where the property, under conveyancing, is intended for housing or private use. Therefore, in insolvency cases affecting the intended vendor, the Supreme Court of Justice understands that when the property is destined for housing, provided the respective assumptions have been verified, the credit of the intended purchaser is guaranteed by the right of retention prevailing over the mortgage. The truth is that a restrictive interpretation of paragraph f) of no. 1 of article 755 of the Civil Code does not seem legally permissible, as it has no support in law. Furthermore, the right of retention thereby provided shall not be applicable in insolvency proceedings, as it contemplates an imperative regime that does not provide for the application of that precept and, consequently, the attribution of such a right of guarantee. Therefore, the credit of said promissory beneficiary shall be classified as common and no longer as guaranteed credit. The differentiation of regimes has led the Supreme Court of Justice to correct interpretation of the law, even if contra legem. On a legislative change to article 106 of the Insolvency Code granting the beneficiary of the promise, even if with merely obligatory effectiveness and in which conveyancing has occurred, the right of retention provided for in paragraph f) of no. 1 of article 755 of the Civil Code, without admitting a restrictive interpretation, will allow adequate legal protection for this beneficiary.
The Supreme Court of Justice through Rulings 4/14 and 4/19 Standardising Jurisprudence handed down in insolvency proceedings, has produced a restrictive interpretation of paragraph f) of no. 1 of article 755 of the Civil Code, considering that right of guarantee, even when faced with the prevalence accorded to the mortgage (if previously registered) only applies to the beneficiary of the intended sale in those cases where the property, under conveyancing, is intended for housing or private use. Therefore, in insolvency cases affecting the intended vendor, the Supreme Court of Justice understands that when the property is destined for housing, provided the respective assumptions have been verified, the credit of the intended purchaser is guaranteed by the right of retention prevailing over the mortgage. The truth is that a restrictive interpretation of paragraph f) of no. 1 of article 755 of the Civil Code does not seem legally permissible, as it has no support in law. Furthermore, the right of retention thereby provided shall not be applicable in insolvency proceedings, as it contemplates an imperative regime that does not provide for the application of that precept and, consequently, the attribution of such a right of guarantee. Therefore, the credit of said promissory beneficiary shall be classified as common and no longer as guaranteed credit. The differentiation of regimes has led the Supreme Court of Justice to correct interpretation of the law, even if contra legem. On a legislative change to article 106 of the Insolvency Code granting the beneficiary of the promise, even if with merely obligatory effectiveness and in which conveyancing has occurred, the right of retention provided for in paragraph f) of no. 1 of article 755 of the Civil Code, without admitting a restrictive interpretation, will allow adequate legal protection for this beneficiary.
Description
Keywords
Direito civil Direito de retenção Promitente-comprador Promitente-adquirente Promitente-vendedor Promitente-alienante Insolvência Garantia comum Acórdão uniformizador de jurisprudência Civil law Right of retention Promisor-buyer Promissory purchaser Promissory vendor Promissory alienator Insolvency Common guarantee Ruling standardising jurisprudence