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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
As estratégias de Hub & Spoke têm vindo a ser estudadas e investigadas por académicos, assim como pelas autoridades nacionais da concorrência em diferentes países. Estas práticas definem-se por esquemas triangulares onde a interação entre os diferentes intervenientes é efetuada através de uma troca indireta de informação, isto é, comunicação através de um terceiro elemento com a qual existe uma relação vertical. De modo a estudar os efeitos estratégicos que estas práticas têm no mercado, comparamos os resultados de dois cenários: cenário com concorrência à la Cournot e cenário com Hub & Spoke. Recorrendo à teoria dos jogos, definimos um modelo com interação vertical entre uma empresa grossista e duas empresas retalhistas. Os resultados sugerem que as práticas de Hub & Spoke, sob determinados pressupostos, podem tornar o conluio sustentável e benéfico para o bem-estar dos consumidores.
Hub & Spoke strategies have been studied and investigated by academics as well as national competition authorities in different countries. These practices are defined by triangular schemes where the interaction between the different actors is carried out through an indirect exchange of information, that is, communication through a third-party with which there is a vertical relationship. In order to study the strategic effects that these practices have on the market, we compare the results of two scenarios: scenario with competition à la Cournot and scenario with Hub & Spoke. Using game theory, we defined a model with vertical interaction between a supplier and two retailers. The results suggest that Hub & Spoke practices, under certain assumptions, can make collusion sustainable and improve consumer welfare.
Hub & Spoke strategies have been studied and investigated by academics as well as national competition authorities in different countries. These practices are defined by triangular schemes where the interaction between the different actors is carried out through an indirect exchange of information, that is, communication through a third-party with which there is a vertical relationship. In order to study the strategic effects that these practices have on the market, we compare the results of two scenarios: scenario with competition à la Cournot and scenario with Hub & Spoke. Using game theory, we defined a model with vertical interaction between a supplier and two retailers. The results suggest that Hub & Spoke practices, under certain assumptions, can make collusion sustainable and improve consumer welfare.
Description
Keywords
Hub & Spoke Conluio Duopólio Hub & Spoke Collusion Duopoly