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Um som de um outro : o objecto, a marca e o símbolo
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Abstract(s)
Como distinguir um som de outro? O quão subtil podem ser as diferenças entre marcas sonoras para que possamos distinguir uma marca de outra? Como é que um qualquer som não é sempre representativo de qualquer coisa? Como é que sequer há sons e não apenas a totalidade Som? Onde existem mecanismos de propagação de ondas mecânicas existe também o potencial para a recepção desses estímulos na cóclea humana, resultando num evento coclear a que chamamos som. Todos os eventos cocleares que consideramos som constroem a homogeneidade da totalidade Som — o aparente continuum sonoro intrínseco à experiência humana do mundo — e cada um desses eventos pode representar mais do que a sua fonte sonora. De acordo com a teoria da representação do filósofo americano Nelson Goodman, tudo é representação. A marca que é sonora surge como o resultado da percepção de um evento coclear que, respondendo a distinções de qualquer natureza, se recorta de um resto. O som, como marca, distinguível de um outro som, potencia múltiplas ficções possíveis. Mas o que é som? A partir de uma investigação que procura compreender como é que o som — visto como um objecto público e partilhável, e por isso do domínio da Linguagem — funciona como símbolo, esta dissertação questiona a própria definição acústica de som. Servindo-se de uma bibliografia assente no nominalismo de Nelson Goodman, com particular foco em The Structure of Appearance (1951), o desafio central é testar o som e a sua definição segundo estas leituras, num estudo em torno da filosofia do som, questionando a definição acústica de som e avançando, exploratoriamente, com possibilidades. Pergunta-se o que é, onde é e quando é o som. A partir de Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics de Peter F. Strawson, levanta-se a hipótese de o som ser aspacial — que não possui ou não nos permite construir uma noção de espaço através deste — reforçando a separação entre som ouvido e fonte sonora. Através de um estudo da homogeneidade, desenvolvido por Austen Clark em The Particulate Instantiation of Homogeneous Pink, sugere-se que a percepção humana possa ser, talvez, considerada digital (discreta e divisível) e que a resolução da percepção humana do mundo é menor do que a resolução do mundo. Nem todos os elementos que compõem um objecto são discrimináveis, há diferenças qualitativas indiscrimináveis que existem abaixo do limiar de percepção. E assim segue que um som Bb de um sino percutido contém elementos Bb, elementos não-Bb e elementos não-sonoros. Este som reconhecido como Bb já não é, para nós, apenas o objet sonore de Pierre Schaeffer e Michel Chion. Este Bb, ouvido num determinado momento fenomenológico, e precisamente por ser reconhecido por um ouvinte como Bb, é agora marca sonora pertencente ao carácter Bb, que é aqui mesmo traduzido também pelo símbolo tipograficamente escrito “Bb”. A distinção entre marcas sonoras não é necessariamente conseguida através da distância temporal, algo que é demonstrado pelo limiar de fusão auditiva e reforçado por Nelson Goodman em The Structure of Appearance argumentando que o factor tempo é sempre um factor em qualquer mudança de um outro factor. Há um mínimo de resolução necessária e o factor tempo por si só não é suficiente para que a distinção entre marcas se torne possível. Sugere-se aqui que a distinção entre marcas sonoras é, talvez, melhor compreendida através do conceito twoity de LEJ Brouwer, uma comparação intuitiva entre um momento que foi e um que é.
How can one distinguish one sound from another? How subtle can the differences between sonic marks be for us to differentiate one mark from another? How is it that any given sound is not always representative of anything? How is it that there are sounds at all and not merely the totality of Sound? Wherever there are mechanisms for the propagation of mechanical waves, there is also the potential for the reception of these stimuli in the human cochlea, resulting in a cochlear event that we call sound. All cochlear events that we consider sound construct the homogeneity of the totality of Sound — the apparent sonic continuum intrinsic to the human experience of the world — and each of these events can represent more than its sound source. According to the representation theory of the American philosopher Nelson Goodman, everything is representation. The sonic mark emerges as the result of the perception of a cochlear event that, responding to distinctions of any nature, is cut out from a remainder. Sound, as a mark, is distinguishable from another sound, potentiating multiple possible fictions. But what is sound? This dissertation, stemming from an investigation that seeks to understand how sound — seen as a public and shareable object, and therefore within the domain of Language — functions as a symbol, questions the very acoustic definition of sound. Drawing upon a bibliography grounded in Nelson Goodman's nominalism, with a particular focus on The Structure of Appearance (1951), the central challenge is to test sound and its definition through these readings in a study in the realms of the philosophy of sound, questioning the acoustic definition of sound advancing, exploratorily, with possibilities. It asks: what is, where is, and when is sound? Based on Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics by Peter F. Strawson, the hypothesis is raised that sound may be aspatial — that it neither possesses nor allows us to construct a notion of space through it — thus reinforcing the separation between heard sound and sound source. Through a study of homogeneity, as developed by Austen Clark in The Particulate Instantiation of Homogeneous Pink, it is suggested that human perception might, perhaps, be considered digital (discrete and divisible) and that the resolution of human perception of the world is lower than the world’s own resolution. Not all elements composing an object are discernible; there are qualitative differences that exist below the threshold of perception. Thus, it follows that a Bb sound from a struck bell contains Bb elements, non-Bb elements, and non-sonic elements. This sound, recognized as Bb, is no longer, for us, merely the objet sonore of Pierre Schaeffer and Michel Chion. This Bb, heard at a specific phenomenological moment, precisely because it is recognized by a listener as Bb, now constitutes a sonic mark belonging to the character Bb, which is here also rendered through the typographically written symbol “Bb.” The distinction between sonic marks is not necessarily achieved through temporal distance, something demonstrated by the auditory fusion threshold and reinforced by Nelson Goodman in The Structure of Appearance, where he argues that the time factor is always present in any change of another factor. There is a minimum resolution required, and the time factor alone is insufficient to enable the distinction between marks. It is here suggested that the distinction between sonic marks may, perhaps, be better understood through LEJ Brouwer’s concept of twoity: an intuitive comparison between a moment that was and a moment that is.
How can one distinguish one sound from another? How subtle can the differences between sonic marks be for us to differentiate one mark from another? How is it that any given sound is not always representative of anything? How is it that there are sounds at all and not merely the totality of Sound? Wherever there are mechanisms for the propagation of mechanical waves, there is also the potential for the reception of these stimuli in the human cochlea, resulting in a cochlear event that we call sound. All cochlear events that we consider sound construct the homogeneity of the totality of Sound — the apparent sonic continuum intrinsic to the human experience of the world — and each of these events can represent more than its sound source. According to the representation theory of the American philosopher Nelson Goodman, everything is representation. The sonic mark emerges as the result of the perception of a cochlear event that, responding to distinctions of any nature, is cut out from a remainder. Sound, as a mark, is distinguishable from another sound, potentiating multiple possible fictions. But what is sound? This dissertation, stemming from an investigation that seeks to understand how sound — seen as a public and shareable object, and therefore within the domain of Language — functions as a symbol, questions the very acoustic definition of sound. Drawing upon a bibliography grounded in Nelson Goodman's nominalism, with a particular focus on The Structure of Appearance (1951), the central challenge is to test sound and its definition through these readings in a study in the realms of the philosophy of sound, questioning the acoustic definition of sound advancing, exploratorily, with possibilities. It asks: what is, where is, and when is sound? Based on Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics by Peter F. Strawson, the hypothesis is raised that sound may be aspatial — that it neither possesses nor allows us to construct a notion of space through it — thus reinforcing the separation between heard sound and sound source. Through a study of homogeneity, as developed by Austen Clark in The Particulate Instantiation of Homogeneous Pink, it is suggested that human perception might, perhaps, be considered digital (discrete and divisible) and that the resolution of human perception of the world is lower than the world’s own resolution. Not all elements composing an object are discernible; there are qualitative differences that exist below the threshold of perception. Thus, it follows that a Bb sound from a struck bell contains Bb elements, non-Bb elements, and non-sonic elements. This sound, recognized as Bb, is no longer, for us, merely the objet sonore of Pierre Schaeffer and Michel Chion. This Bb, heard at a specific phenomenological moment, precisely because it is recognized by a listener as Bb, now constitutes a sonic mark belonging to the character Bb, which is here also rendered through the typographically written symbol “Bb.” The distinction between sonic marks is not necessarily achieved through temporal distance, something demonstrated by the auditory fusion threshold and reinforced by Nelson Goodman in The Structure of Appearance, where he argues that the time factor is always present in any change of another factor. There is a minimum resolution required, and the time factor alone is insufficient to enable the distinction between marks. It is here suggested that the distinction between sonic marks may, perhaps, be better understood through LEJ Brouwer’s concept of twoity: an intuitive comparison between a moment that was and a moment that is.
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Keywords
Som Percepção Contínuo Distinção Marca Representação Sound Perception Continuum Distinction Mark Representation
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