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A teoria da agência explica que existem conflitos de interesse entre gestores e acionistas. A remuneração variável é um dos mecanismos que pode mitigar esse problema e alinhar interesses, mas pode também incentivar os executivos a manipular resultados para alcançar os objetivos definidos, muito embora eficientes mecanismos de governo das sociedades possam ser suficientes para anular os incentivos à manipulação de resultados decorrentes da atribuição de remunerações variáveis. Esta dissertação visa estudar o impacto da remuneração variável de executivos na manipulação de resultados no contexto português. Para dar resposta a este objetivo, foi utilizado o Modelo de Jones Modificado cross-sectional, para quantificar a manipulação de resultados através dos accruals discricionários, e um modelo de regressão linear múltipla, para aferir se existe uma correlação estatisticamente significativa entre a remuneração variável de curto prazo e a manipulação de resultados, tal como entre a remuneração variável de médio-longo prazo e a manipulação de resultados. Os dados foram recolhidos dos relatórios financeiros das empresas, dos relatórios de governo das sociedades e da base de dados Refinitiv Eikon. A amostra é constituída por 38 empresas cotadas na Euronext Lisbon, entre 2015 e 2021, inclusive. Os resultados indicam que não existe qualquer relação estatisticamente significativa entre a remuneração variável de curto prazo e a manipulação de resultados, observando-se o mesmo com a remuneração variável de médio-longo prazo. Estes resultados sugerem que as empresas podem utilizar a remuneração variável para alinhar interesses entre gestores e acionistas, sem a desvantagem de incentivar maior manipulação de resultados através de accruals.
The agency theory explains that conflicts of interest occur between managers and shareholders. The variable compensation is a mechanism that can mitigate these problems and align interests, however it can encourage executive directors to manipulate results to achieve defined objectives, although efficient corporate governance mechanisms may suffice to nullify the incentives to earnings management arising from the attribution of variable compensation. The present dissertation aims to study the impact of the variable compensation of executive directors on earnings management in the portuguese context. To reach this goal, the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model was used to quantify the earnings management through discretionary accruals, and a multiple linear regression model was used to assess whether there is a statistically significant correlation between the short-term variable compensation and earnings management, as well as between the medium/long-term variable compensation and earnings management. The data used was collected from the companies’ financial reports, as well as corporate governance reports and the Refinitiv Eikon database. The sample consists of 38 companies listed on Euronext Lisbon, between 2015 and 2021, inclusive. The results indicate that there is no statistically significant correlation between short-term variable compensation and earnings management, the same being observed with medium/long-term variable compensation. These results suggest that companies can use variable compensation to align interests between managers and shareholders, without the disadvantage of encouraging greater earnings management through accruals.
The agency theory explains that conflicts of interest occur between managers and shareholders. The variable compensation is a mechanism that can mitigate these problems and align interests, however it can encourage executive directors to manipulate results to achieve defined objectives, although efficient corporate governance mechanisms may suffice to nullify the incentives to earnings management arising from the attribution of variable compensation. The present dissertation aims to study the impact of the variable compensation of executive directors on earnings management in the portuguese context. To reach this goal, the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model was used to quantify the earnings management through discretionary accruals, and a multiple linear regression model was used to assess whether there is a statistically significant correlation between the short-term variable compensation and earnings management, as well as between the medium/long-term variable compensation and earnings management. The data used was collected from the companies’ financial reports, as well as corporate governance reports and the Refinitiv Eikon database. The sample consists of 38 companies listed on Euronext Lisbon, between 2015 and 2021, inclusive. The results indicate that there is no statistically significant correlation between short-term variable compensation and earnings management, the same being observed with medium/long-term variable compensation. These results suggest that companies can use variable compensation to align interests between managers and shareholders, without the disadvantage of encouraging greater earnings management through accruals.
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Palavras-chave
Manipulação de resultados Remuneração variável Modelo de Jones modificado Accruals discricionários Administradores executivos Earnings management Variable compensation Modified Jones model Discretionary accruals Executive directors