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Authors
Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Em 2018, num estudo conduzido e publicado por Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer e
Song Ma, no setor farmacêutico, foi elaborada e dada a conhecer uma nova teoria do risco
de lesão concorrencial, nos termos da qual empresas estabelecidas no mercado adquirem
empresas nascentes com o objetivo único de descontinuar o respetivo produto inovador –
Killer Acquisitions. Nele se demonstra ainda que, por não preencherem os limiares de
notificação ex ante de operações de concentração, estas aquisições têm escapado ao
escrutínio das autoridades da concorrência. Desde então, a literatura tem demonstrado
que a preocupação com efeitos anticoncorrenciais da aquisição de empresas nascentes–
ainda que nem sempre nos moldes das Killer Acquisitions – não se cinge ao setor
farmacêutico, mas estende-se também a outros setores do mercado, particularmente
dinâmicos, como o digital. Na medida em que estas operações têm escapado ao controlo
administrativo das concentrações, discute-se atualmente se existe uma tendência para a
não atuação das autoridades da concorrência em concentrações que envolvam start-ups,
se a situação deve alterar-se e, neste caso, que medidas deverão ser adotadas para a
investigação, e proibição, quando necessário, de operações que envolvam tais empresas
nascentes.
In 2018, a paperwork conducted and published by Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer e Song Ma in the pharmaceutical sector elaborated and introduced a new theory of harm, according to which dominant firms acquire nascent firms with the sole purpose of discontinuing their innovative product - Killer Acquisitions. Said paperwork also evidenced that, by not meeting the ex-ante merger notification thresholds, these acquisitions have escaped the scrutiny of the competition authorities. Since then, the literature has shown that the concern with anticompetitive effects of acquisitions of startups - even if in different contours than those of Killer Acquisitions - is not confined to the pharmaceutical sector, but also extends to other markets, particularly dynamic ones, such as the digital sector. As these concentrations have escaped administrative merger control, it is currently being discussed whether there is a trend towards the non-action of competition authorities in mergers involving start-ups, whether the situation should change and, if so, what measures should be adopted for the investigation, and prohibition, where necessary, of transactions involving such start-ups.
In 2018, a paperwork conducted and published by Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer e Song Ma in the pharmaceutical sector elaborated and introduced a new theory of harm, according to which dominant firms acquire nascent firms with the sole purpose of discontinuing their innovative product - Killer Acquisitions. Said paperwork also evidenced that, by not meeting the ex-ante merger notification thresholds, these acquisitions have escaped the scrutiny of the competition authorities. Since then, the literature has shown that the concern with anticompetitive effects of acquisitions of startups - even if in different contours than those of Killer Acquisitions - is not confined to the pharmaceutical sector, but also extends to other markets, particularly dynamic ones, such as the digital sector. As these concentrations have escaped administrative merger control, it is currently being discussed whether there is a trend towards the non-action of competition authorities in mergers involving start-ups, whether the situation should change and, if so, what measures should be adopted for the investigation, and prohibition, where necessary, of transactions involving such start-ups.
Description
Keywords
Direito da concorrência Controlo de concentrações Killer acquisitions Reverse killer acquisitions Start-ups Limiares de comunicação de concentração Mercado relevante Inovação Mercados dinâmicos Competition law Merger control Merger notification thresholds Relevant market Innovation Dynamic markets