Percorrer por autor "Lefouili, Yassine"
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- Collusion between two-sided platformsPublication . Lefouili, Yassine; Pinho, JoanaWe study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
- Collusion between two-sided platformsPublication . Lefouili, Yassine; Pinho, JoanaWe study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
- Collusion in two-sided marketsPublication . Lefouili, Yassine; Pinho, Joana
- Horizontal mergers between multisided platforms: insights from Cournot competitionPublication . Correia-da-Silva, João; Jullien, Bruno; Lefouili, Yassine; Pinho, JoanaThis paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multisided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two-sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of “average-marginal-cost-preserving” mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multisided platforms.
- Horizontal mergers between multisided platforms: insights from cournot competitionPublication . Correia-da-Silva, Joao; Jullien, Bruno; Lefouili, Yassine; Pinho, JoanaThis paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multisided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two‐sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of “average‐marginal‐cost‐preserving” mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multisided platforms.