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Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
This paper analyses a sequential merger formation game in a setting where: (i) firms compete à la Stackelberg; (ii) mergers may give rise to endogenous efficiency gains; and (iii) every merger has to be submitted for approval to the Antitrust Authority (AA). Two different types of AA are studied: first, we assume a myopic AA, which accepts or rejects a given merger without considering that this merger may be followed by other mergers; and, second, a forward looking AA, which anticipates the final industry structure a merger will give rise to, if approved. We conclude that these two types of AA adopt similar decisions whenever a merger would not trigger the exit of outsider firms. Their decisions are, however, shown to be very different when evaluating exit-inducing merger proposals.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Mergers Myopic versus forward-looking merger control Stackelberg
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Cunha, M., Vasconcelos, H. (2018). Sequential Mergers and Antitrust Authority's Decisions in Stackelberg Markets. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade,18, 373–394
Editora
Springer Verlag