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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
The purpose of this dissertation is to access the impact stricter employment protection
legislation on the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device. To achieve this, I first
confirm the results found by Centeno and Novo (2012) on the impact of the 2004 labor code
reform over excess worker turnover and the share of fixed-term contracts on Portuguese
firms, and then explore the link between those indicators and the transition of fixed-term to
open-ended contracts. While the link between more stringent employment protection
legislation and a higher reliance on fixed term contracts seems clear, the strategy of using
fixed-term contracts as a screening device appears to be persistent, and more affected by
idiosyncratic factors than external policy changes.