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On-site inspecting zombie lending

dc.contributor.authorBonfim, Diana
dc.contributor.authorCerqueiro, Geraldo
dc.contributor.authorDegryse, Hans
dc.contributor.authorOngena, Steven R. G.
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-19T09:03:28Z
dc.date.available2022-07-19T09:03:28Z
dc.date.issued2020-02-27
dc.description.abstractIn spite of growing regulatory pressure in most developed economies, “zombie lending” remains a widespread practice by banks. In this paper we exploit a series of large-scale on-site inspections made on the credit portfolios of several Portuguese banks to investigate how these inspections affect banks’ future lending decisions. We find that an inspected bank becomes 20% less likely to refinance zombie firms, immediately spurring their default. Overall, banks seemingly reduce zombie lending because the incentives to hold these loans disappear once they are forced to recognize losses.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.3530574pt_PT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/38269
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSwiss Finance Institute Research Paper;20-16
dc.subjectZombie lending
dc.subjectBank supervision
dc.titleOn-site inspecting zombie lendingpt_PT
dc.typepreprint
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.titleOn-site inspecting zombie lendingpt_PT
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typepreprintpt_PT

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