Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction

Gonçalves, Ricardo; Ray, Indrajit

Publication

Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction

2024-02-01Journal article

dc.contributor.author	Gonçalves, Ricardo
dc.contributor.author	Ray, Indrajit
dc.date.accessioned	2023-09-15T16:59:17Z
dc.date.available	2023-09-15T16:59:17Z
dc.date.issued	2024-02-01
dc.description.abstract	We consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Goncalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177-179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.	pt_PT
dc.description.version	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion	pt_PT
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7	pt_PT
dc.identifier.eid	85175116668
dc.identifier.issn	1434-4742
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42402
dc.identifier.wos	001039119600001
dc.language.iso	eng	pt_PT
dc.peerreviewed	yes	pt_PT
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	pt_PT
dc.subject	Discrete bids	pt_PT
dc.subject	Japanese-English auctions	pt_PT
dc.subject	Partitions	pt_PT
dc.subject	Pooling equilibrium	pt_PT
dc.subject	Seller's revenue	pt_PT
dc.subject	Separating equilibrium	pt_PT
dc.subject	Wallet game	pt_PT
dc.title	Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction	pt_PT
dc.type	journal article
dspace.entity.type	Publication
oaire.citation.endPage	150
oaire.citation.issue	1
oaire.citation.startPage	125
oaire.citation.title	Review of Economic Design	pt_PT
oaire.citation.volume	28
rcaap.rights	openAccess	pt_PT
rcaap.type	article	pt_PT